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I study the impact of different incentives on strategic decisions of parties that have the option
of cooperating with each other. Incentive problems are well studied in various contexts, such
as supply chain management and healthcare operations management. However, in the fastchanging business environment, there is a need to study and understand the new and
emerging strategic behaviors of firms to adopt better incentive mechanisms and reach desired
outcomes. This dissertation consists of three essays that examine the strategic behavior of
parties under different incentive schemes.
In the first essay, I study the supply chain partnership of two potential competitors
and evaluate the impact of limited capacity on their strategic behavior. An increasing number
of original brand manufacturers (OBMs) do not have in-house production capability, and
thus rely on competitive contract manufacturers (CCMs) on the supply side. This increasing
demand puts CCMs in a capacity allocation dilemma between their own product and the
two potential competitors to
cooperate and compete (coopetition), compete, or only cooperate (supply chain partnership).
I show that the OBM might multi-source its component demand only when competition in
the final-product market is intense. Moreover, the CCM can be worse off from having more

The second and third essays are inspired by changes in healthcare funding models
that reward quality care. In the second essay, I examine performance-based payment
contracts to promote the optimal use of an optional diagnostic test that will help determine if
a cancer patient would benefit from an advanced treatment option. This essay is inspired by
three ongoing trends: tremendous increases in the cost of new advanced cancer drugs,
development of new diagnostic tests to allow physicians to tailor treatments to patients, and
changes in healthcare funding models that reward quality care. I model the interaction
between two parties

a healthcare payer and an oncologist

where the oncologist has

not know whether the optimal course of action is used by the oncologist (moral hazard). I
demonstrate that, in the presence of information asymmetry, an oncologist should never test
all patients, even when the diagnostic test is available for free. I also show that it is not
ii

always socially optimal to make a diagnostic test compulsory, even if such a policy can be
implemented for free.
In the third essay, I study gain-sharing agreements between a hospital and a
healthcare provider that can only treat a patient and achieve the desired quality of care with
collective effort. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) introduced a
bundled payment model for lower extremity joint replacement (LEJR) that offers hospitals a
-acute care.
This bundled payment model aims to incentivize hospitals to enter into agreements with
providers to ensure that the total treatment cost and care quality meets the bundled payment
requirements. However, I show that the bundled payment does not always incentivize a
hospital to offer gain-sharing agreements to the provider. Furthermore, I show that the
provider prefers a low bundled payment, such that the hospital needs the provider to reduce
the total cost of treatment.

Keywords
Strategic Supply Chain Management, Game Theory, Incentive alignment, Contract Design,
Operations Research, Management Science, Health Economics
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Chapter 1

1
Recent technological advances have led to a substantial increase in the sophistication of
products and services. Companies now have more customized and targeted products and
services than ever before. As a result, it has become impossible for organizations to
contain all procedures and production in-house. Instead, firms are becoming more
specialized and focused, which has led to decentralized and fragmented supply chains.
For example, outsourcing the production of components of a product is a very common
practice among original brand manufacturers (OBMs) because doing so (instead of
investing in production facilities) allows firms to invest in product development instead,
which may provide greater competitive advantage. New Venture Research (NVR)
estimates that the contract manufacturing industry will grow from $430 billion in 2015 to
$580 billion in 2020 (NVR, 2016).
Similarly, in the healthcare industry, the growing number of treatment options and
availability of personalized medicine have dramatically increased the cost of treatment
and the number of care providers. For instance, the 21-gene assay for breast cancer
(Oncotype Dx), introduced by Genomic Health Inc. in 2004, is a gene-expression
profiling test that can help guide cancer treatment decisions. Likewise, there are many
independent care providers that specialize in a specific procedure required in treating a
. However, in a fragmented healthcare system enforcing standard
protocols to ensure that physicians follow through with appropriate patient care is a
barrier to adopting these new technologies (Davis et al., 2010). Therefore, as Kaplan and
Porter (2012) describe, one of the challenges in terms of healthcare cost crises is the
complex path of care due to the highly fragmented way in which healthcare is delivered.
It is well known that, decentralization creates inefficiency in supply chains. This
inefficiency is caused by a lack of coordination among the different stages of a supply
chain, and the lack of coordination among parties stems from two causes: (1) conflict
between the respective interests and objectives of the parties, and (2) the distortion of
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information as it moves between the stages of the supply chain. The purpose of this thesis
decisions under different incentive mechanisms. The results generated from this thesis
add to the current knowledge on the effects of decentralization on supply chains.
Moreover, I provide managerial insights for firms in both the manufacturing and
healthcare industries on how to coordinate their supply chains using some incentive
mechanisms. Supply chain partnership and coordination provide firms with higher
revenues and opportunities to access more financial resources for future business
investments. I illustrate how the new advancements in healthcare services require
alternative payment mechanisms to achieve a higher quality of care and lower treatment
costs. Finally, this thesis highlights the importance of customizing coordinating
mechanisms to the specific system settings by showing the sensitivity of the coordination
and strategic decisions of firms to these incentive mechanisms.

1.1
In Chapter 2, I study the supply chain partnership of two potential competitors
and a competitive contract manufacturer (CCM)

an OBM

and evaluate the impact of limited

capacity on their strategic behavior. It is common for firms in different stages of a
decentralized supply chain to compete with each other in the final product market. There
are many studies that examine the scenario of competition between supply chain partners
(e.g., Venkatesh et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2014). These
studies either analyze the partnership of competitors for the supply of a proprietary
component, or do not incorporate the limited capacity on the supply side of the shared
component.
In Chapter 2, I extend the literature to a more realistic setting, where there is
competition in the component market and the CCM faces a resource allocation problem
due to limited capacity when choosing a partnership strategy with its competitor. I derive
the conditions that incentivize the two potential competitors to cooperate and compete
(coopetition), compete, or only cooperate (supply chain partnership). In particular, I show
how firms can optimally use supply chain partnership and resource allocation to
overcome the operational and pricing obstacles in a decentralized supply chain. I show
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that the OBM might multi-source its component demand only when competition in the
final-product market is intense.
might decrease while retail price might increase. Moreover, even when capacity is
available for free, the CCM can be worse off from having more capacity. Further, the
competing products become more substitutable.
In Chapter 3, I study the incentive problem of a healthcare purchaser (payer) and
a healthcare provider (provider) for using a diagnostic test; to do so, I investigate
performance-based payment contracts to align the incentives of two parties to achieve
optimal use of optional diagnostic tests. There are studies in healthcare operations
regarding use of diagnostic tests in various
healthcare settings (e.g., Yaesoubi and Roberts, 2011; Dai et al., 2015; Dai et al., 2016). I
extend this literature by studying payment mechanisms that coordinates the incentives of
a healthcare payer and a provider, in the presence of information asymmetry, while
-making
process. I show that the advent of new diagnostic tests necessitates new reimbursement
models because current payment models do not account for treatment choices of the
provider, and thus cannot coordinate a decentralized healthcare setting. I also highlight
the importance of information flow in the healthcare system by showing that when there
is imperfect information flow between the payer and the provider, the payer should
motivate the provider to only test certain types of patients, even if the diagnostic test can
be available for free. Furthermore, I find that an increase in reputational concerns and
altruistic behavior of a provider may increase social welfare. Finally, I show that it is not
always socially optimal to make a diagnostic test compulsory, even if there is no cost to
implement such a policy.
In Chapter 4, I study gain-sharing agreements between a hospital and a provider
that can only treat a patient and achieve the desired quality of care collectively. There are
some studies that evaluate gain-sharing agreements in healthcare operations management,
especially in the pharmaceutical industry (Barros, 2011; Zhang et al., 2011; Mahjoub et
al., 2013). These studies analyze the coordination of a pharmaceutical company with a
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There are also papers that investigate bundled payment models in different healthcare
settings (Andritsos and Tang, 2015; Adida et al., 2016; Guo et al., 2016). I extend the
literature by studying the impact of gain-sharing agreements in a healthcare setting with a
bundled payment that ties the profit of the hospital and the provider. This study is
motivated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) lower extremity
joint replacement (LEJR) bundled payment. This bundled payment model aims to
incentivize hospitals to enter into agreements with providers to coordinate care and to
ensure that the total treatment cost and care quality meets the bundled payment
requirements. I illustrate that a target price bundled payment model would be more
effective in healthcare settings where there is more asymmetry between the hospital and
-reduction efficiency. I also show that while using a gain-sharing
agreement might be a win-win-win scenario for the payer, the hospital, and the provider,
good design of the target price bundled payment is essential to incentivize a hospital to
offer gain-sharing agreements to the provider. In addition, the provider prefers a low
bundled payment such that the hospital needs the provider to reduce the total cost of
treatment.
In the final chapter, I present an overview of the main results and the managerial
insights from the analysis of the fragmented supply chain settings discussed in the thesis.
I further highlight the policy implications of the implementation of the results.
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Chapter 2

2
Outsourcing the production of selected components to competitors is becoming more
attention to outsourcing and the growing demand in many markets can result in capacity
allocation conflicts for the contract manufacturers. In this study, I consider a scenario in
which the OBM decides whether to outsource to a third-party supplier or to a competitive
contract manufacturer (CCM) who has the option of producing a competing product and
also has limited capacity. The CCM first chooses the wholesale price and decides
whether or not to sell a competing product to the customers. Next, the OBM decides the
proportion of its component demand to outsource to the CCM, and then firms set the
retail prices. I show that the OBM might multi-source its component demand only when
competition in the final-product market is intense. I
increases, demand may decrease while the retail price may increase. Moreover, the CCM
can be worse off from havin
free. The results also show that demand may increase when competition in the finalproduct market becomes more intense. Finally, I find that the value of having a thirdparty supplier to produce the component decreases amid the intensity of competition in
the final-product market.

2.1
TPV Technology (TPV), the largest electronic manufacturer of computer monitors, sells
monitors under its own brands

AOC and Envision

in the final-product market and

acts as a supplier to Philips, which sells monitors under the Philips brand. This
overall demand for monitors is beyond the capacity of TPV, and thus, TPV has decided
to reduce the production of its own brands in order to satisfy the outsourcing orders it
receives from Philips (Wang, 2008).
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Outsourcing the production of certain components to competitive contract
manufacturers (CCMs) like TPV is becoming more common among original brand
manufacturers (OBMs); however, growing demand often results in capacity-allocation
conflicts for these CCMs. For example, Apple outsources its NAND Flash memory
requirement to Samsung (Kim, 2012), but as smartphones become more popular,
Samsung finds it increasingly difficult to fulfill the demand. Such capacity-allocation
mple,
Franz Inc. (Franz) is a contract manufacturer that produces home décor accessories (e.g.,
tableware, vases and jewellery) for OBMs like Enesco and Lenox. In 2002, Franz started
to sell products under its own brand while continuing to supply for the OBMs. The
company reached its capacity limit due to increasing orders from OBMs, and eventually,
in 2005, Franz decided to prioritize the production of its own brand products ahead of
others (Yan, 2013). Tesla Motors was the supplier of battery packs for Mercedes B-class
Electric Drive. Despite strong demand for its own automobile, the Tesla Model S, Tesla
Motors could not increase the production amount due to its limited supply of batteries
(Herron, 2013).
These examples show that when the CCM has a limited capacity, the OBM can
capacity, thereby mitigating competition in the final-product market. On the other hand,
precisely because of this reason, the CCM sets a higher wholesale price, and thus, the
introduction of a capacity constraint adds some interesting trade-offs for the firms. As
both cooperation between competitors and capacity shortages begin to occur with
increasing frequency, studies of the interaction between these phenomena and the
resulting impacts become more relevant.
In this study, I
limited capacity. In particular, the OBM does not produce a critical component of its
product in-house (e.g., the comp

9

the component to be outsourced to the CCM while the remaining production can be
outsourced to a third-party supplier. The CCM has limited capacity in the production of
the critical component, so it must decide whether or not to sell products to customers
under its own brand. Moreover, the CCM must decide the wholesale price of the
component in order to compete with other third-party suppliers.
This study considers the following research questions:
1.
ility?
2. How do the competition in the final-product market (between the OBM and
the CCM) and the competition in the component market (between the CCM
and the thirdprofitability?
In response to these questions, I present several interesting findings. First, despite
the fact that CCM has the option of not selling final products to customers, but rather
I find that the firms may forgo this
opportunity. In particular, regardless of the capacity limit, the CCM always sells in the
final-product market when the competition between the OBM and the CCM in low.
However, when the competition in the final-product market is very intense, the CCM
might hold a monopoly in the component market, while the OBM holds a monopoly in
the final-product market. In order to be the monopoly in the final-product market, the
the rest of its component demand from the cheaper third-party suppliers. I also show that
the OBM only multi-source its component when the CCM does not sell in the finalproduct market.
Second, when capacity increases, one might expect that demand would increase
while retail price would decrease. Surprisingly, I find that this intuition does not hold true
when there is a shift in outsourcing strategy. Moreover, even when capacity is available
ofit
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are competitors. Third, my
increase when the competing products become more substitutable. Furthermore, even
though the CCM has less incentive to allocate its capacity to produce components for the
OBM when the intensity of competition in the final-product market increases, the value
of having a third-party supplier to produce the component decreases as competition
intensifies.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I review the related
literature. I then present the mathematical model and the analytical results in Sections 2.3
and 2.4. In Section 2.5, I analyze the value of competition in the component market
through a comparison of the basic model using a benchmark model without the thirdparty supplier. In Section 2.6, I consider a scenario where OBM can order excess quantity
(buy-and-

-product market. Finally, I provide

concluding remarks and managerial insights. I present the details of the derivation of the
equilibriums and the proofs of the results in Appendix-A.

2.2
My study relates to two areas of research. The first stream of literature examines the
scenario of competition between supply-chain partners. Venkatesh et al. (2006) and Xu et
al. (2010) study the optimal strategies of a manufacturer who owns the proprietary
component brand. The manufacturer decides whether to use the components exclusively,
whether to become a supplier of an OBM, or whether to become a hybrid of both. These
two studies show that the proprietary component manufacturer should hold a monopoly
in the final-product market only when the two products are almost perfect substitutes. In
my study, the component is not of a proprietary nature, so the manufacturer cannot hold a
monopoly in the final-product market.
Wang et al. (2013) examine the advantage of being the first mover when the
component is not of a pr
wholesale price should be smaller than the thirdHowever, I show that in a setting with capacity, the OBM would be willing to pay a
higher wholesale price in order to reduce competition in the final-product market. Pun
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(2014) studies how an OBM should outsource its non-proprietary components when
firms can exert effort to improve their production process. This author finds that the
OBM might be better off outsourcing both the production and the process-improvement
effort to the competitor, even when the competitor has a higher cost. Pun (2015)
considers the optimal degree of cooperation between two competing manufacturers when
the components are not proprietary and finds that competitors can be worse off from
more cooperation, even when these competitors have better production capabilities. The
studies discussed in this stream of literature do not consider capacity constraints, so I
extend this literature by considering suppliers that have limited capacity.
This study examines the ways that capacity constraint affects firms. Osborne and
Pitchik (1986) characterize the Nash equilibria in a duopoly that has limited capacity,
showing that limited capacity could be beneficial because capacity constraint can be used
to mitigate competition. Gupta and Wang (2007) study the capacity-allocation problem of
a contract manufacturer that can accept two types of orders: high-volume contractual
orders and one-time transactional orders. They find that the threshold acceptance policy
is optimal, and a contract manufacturer can be better off serving only transactional orders
when capacity is tight. Ülkü et al. (2007) consider the capacity constraint of a contract
manufacturer and consider how the risk should be distributed to different OBMs when
-to-stock
and make-to-order mechanisms for a supplier, seeking the point at which the fixedcapacity allocation level between two different orders becomes optimal. Martínez-deAlbéniz and Talluri (2011) study dynamic price competition under uncertain demand.
They provide a characterization of the equilibrium and show that firms may price their
product at the reservation value of their competitor. The studies discussed in this
paragraph assume that the firms are either supply-chain partners or competitors, and I
extend this stream of literature by considering the case where competitors are also
supply-chain partners.
Yang et al. (2014) consider the distribution strategies of a manufacturer of
proprietary component brands with limited capacity when the OBM and its supplier are
competitors in the final-product market. These authors find that the OBM may order
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excess inventory, and all firms and their customers can be better off from a system with
limited capacity. In my study, I consider the case where the component is of a commodity
nature, such that there is more than one supplier for the component. Therefore, I consider
competition in the component market, and this competition provides an upper limit to the
wholesale price that the OBM is willing to accept.
To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to examine how capacity affects the
supply-chain structure in an oligopolistic competition when one firm might outsource a
commodity component to its competitor.

2.3
I consider a scenario where an OBM (firm O) must outsource the production of a critical
component. The component can be a monitor for the TPV example, a NAND Flash
memory for the Samsung example, or a battery pack in Tesla example. For simplicity, I
follow the literature on the supply-chain relationship between competitors (e.g.,
Venkatesh et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2013; Pun, 2014; Pun, 2015) by
assuming that the final product consists of this component only.
There are two potential suppliers of this component. The first is a CCM (firm C)
that also has a competing product. The production cost is normalized to zero, and firm C
sells components to firm O at a wholesale price

.

capacity of the component is .1 Similar to Gupta and Wang (2007), I assume that firm C
produces everything in-house and does not outsource to other third-party suppliers when
facing capacity shortage.
The second component supplier is a third-party supplier (firm T) that does not
have the option of producing a competitive product under its own brand. Firm T can also

1

Since there are many industry examples where a firm reveals its production capacity, I assume that firm
I note that Samsung and TPV Technologies
present their capacity information on public websites (www.icinsights.com/news/bulletins/SamsungTSMC-And-Micron-Top-List-Of-IC-Industry-Capacity-Leaders/ and www.tpvtech.com/attachment/201504131218064_en. pdf).
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be interpreted as the spot market, where the component can be purchased off the shelf.
Similar to other related literature on contract manufacturing (e.g., Jeannet, 2009; Wang et
al., 2013), I assume that there are many identical and independent third-party suppliers
is in line with many industry practices. As an example, even though Samsung holds a
30% market share in the NAND Flash memory market, there are many other noncompetitive suppliers (e.g., Toshiba, SanDisk and Intel) from which Apple can outsource
this critical component (DRAMeXchange, 2014). I incorporate the asymmetry between
the component manufacturers by assuming firm C can be more cost-efficient than firm T
(Arya et al., 2008; Pun, 2015). Thus, unlike firm C, the production cost of firm T is
assumed to be non-negative. Due to the intense competition among these suppliers, firm
is exogenously determined as the equilibrium market price in
a competitive market which is simply the production cost (i.e., perfect competition). Note
that, when

the two component suppliers are symmetric. The reason that, unlike
O might

accept a higher wholesale price for the component of firm C (compared to the price
offered by other non-competitive suppliers) only because buying from firm C can reduce
-product market. Moreover, since firm O can outsource to any
of these non-competitive suppliers whenever one of them meets capacity, I do not
consider a capacity limit for firm T.
Firm O decides the proportion of its component demand to be allocated to firm C
(

), and the remaining component demand (

) will be allocated to firm T.

There are three outsourcing strategies for firm O: (1) Firm O does not outsource to firm C
(i.e.,

), so firms O and C are pure competitor; (2) Firm O single-sources to firm C

(i.e.,

), and (3) firm O multi-sources to firms C and T (i.e.,

firms are supply-chain partners and competitors when

). The two

if firm C also sells products

under its own brand.
The customers are assumed to have a unit reservation price for a product, and the
products of firms O and C are located at an exogenously specified distance
When

apart.

is small, the two products are more substitutable, and hence competition
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becomes intense. The length of the Hotelling line is sufficiently larger than

such that

all customers located between the two firms would buy, but not all customers located
outside the two firms would buy. Each customer incurs a disutility per unit distance and
will buy whichever product provides the higher positive utility. Despite the fact that all
the results can be driven for more general form, for expositional convenience, I assume
that the disutility per unit distance is equal to 1. Therefore, the total demand depends on
the distance

between two products. Customers would have zero utility when not

making a purchase. Thus, when buying a product from firm
customer that is

at retail price

,a

away from firm would have utility:
(2.1)

Figure 2.1:

( ) can be derived from the
al., 2006; Xu et al., 2010). Figure 2.1
utilities and the demands; the triangles illust
products (customers at zero distance will have a utility of

). For each product, I

find the location of the customer who is indifferent between buying a product or not
(customer with zero utility located in the far-left or far-right of the Hotelling line). Then I
find the location of the customer located between the two products who is indifferent
between buying either product. The total demand of a product would be the sum of the

15

distances of the indifferent customers located outside and inside the two firms on the
Hotelling line. Consequently, the profit function of firm O is as follows:
(2.2)
The two parts of
under its own brand, the profit and the capacity constraint are
(2.3)
(2.4)
When firm C does not sell products under its own brand, the profit and the capacity
constraint of firm C are
(2.5)
(2.6)
As commonly used in the related literature (e.g., Cui et al., 2008; Wang et al.,
2013) and consistent with many industry practices (e.g., Foxconn, Asustek), I assume that
firm C first sets the wholesale price

and then firm O decides the proportion of its

component demand to be outsourced to each supplier, given the wholesale prices.
Therefore, I consider two levels of competition: competition in the component market
between firms C and T, and competition in the final-product market between firms O and
C. The game sequence is as follows.
1) Firm C decides

and chooses whether or not to sell its own product.

2) Firm O decides .
3) Firm O decides

. If applicable, firm C decides

I use backward induction to find the equilibrium solutions.

.
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2.4
The competition in the final-product market, that is captured through product
substitutability

I will show

in Propositions 2.1 and 2.4 that firm O always single sources when the degree of
competition is low (

) and might multi-source when competition is intense (

). This is because firm C cannot set an arbitrary high wholesale price due to the
competition with firm T in the component market. Moreover, when the competition
between firms O and C in the final-product market is small, firm O is not willing to pay a
high wholesale price to buy-out firm C's capacity.
For clarity of expositions, I first focus the analysis to the case when the product
competition is low (

). Specifically, I present the equilibrium strategy in

Proposition 2.1. I
and profit in Proposition 2.
demand in Proposition 2.3. Lastly, I expand the analysis to the case when the final
product competition is very intense (

) in Proposition 2.4.

In order to derive the equilibrium solution, I use the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
t. I separate the optimization problem
into two cases: 1) binding capacity equilibrium, where firm C uses all of its capacity; and
2) non-binding capacity equilibrium, where firm C has some unused capacity.
Consequently, starting from the last stage of the game, I derive two different sets of
optimal pricing strategies for the firms, depending on the capacity constraint (i.e.,
binding/non-binding). In the second stage of the game, firm O decides the proportion of
its component demand to be allocated to firm C (
wholesale price (
substitutability

and

and product

. Finally, in the first stage of the game, firm C chooses its wholesale

price, anticipating the outsourcing strategy of firm O.
In the equilibrium solution, firm C maximizes its profit function by choosing the
wholesale price
ility and participation constraints.
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The incentive compatibility constraint ensures that firm O would not deviate to other
firm O gets at least as much as its outside option when it outsources to firm T. Finally,
knowing the best outcome of each strategy, firm C chooses the equilibrium strategy with
its wholesale price, depending on capacity
substitutability

and product

. Details of the derivation of the equilibrium are presented in Appendix-

A.
First, I present the results for the case when the product competition is low, and
then I show the effect of high product competition on the equilibrium solution.
Lemma 2.1: Define

. When the

competition in the final-product market is low (i.e.,

) firm C always sells in the

final-product market.
Lemma 2.1 shows that firm C always sells in the final-product market when the
competition in the final-product market is low. This is because when competition
between the two products is intense, firm O would have more benefit if firm C does not
sell product to the customers. However, when the degree of competition is not high, there
-product market
-product
market because of low profits in the component market resulted from lower acceptable
wholesale prices by firm O.
Proposition 2.1 and Figure 2.2 present the optimal strategies of the two firms
when

. I define four regions: firm O outsources to firm T in Regions I and II, and

constraint is binding in Regions I and III, and firm C has excess capacity in Regions II
and IV. I also define capacity thresholds

and

(i.e.,

) to

describe the locations of the strategy changes in the equilibrium solution. For example,
is located at the boundary of Regions II and III. I denote the optimal solution with
superscrip

, and

is the
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maximum acceptable wholesale price by firm O such that it is better off to outsource to
firm C if and only if
Proposition 2.1: When

. See Appendix-A for analytical expressions.
, the optimal strategy is such that firm C sells products to

customers and
1) If

, firm O outsources to firm T and

.

2) If

, firm O outsources to firm C and

.

The capacity constraint is binding if and only if

or

.

When firm C has plenty of capacity (Region IV), it has sufficient capacity to
produce for both firms. The literature that studies supply-chain partnerships with a
competitor focuses on this region (e.g., Venkatesh et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2010; Wang et
al., 2013). However, I show that even in Region IV firm O might accept a wholesale
price from firm C that is higher than that of firm T (i.e.,

). This is because firm

O would be better off when cooperating with its competitor compared to the case where it
outsources to firm T.

Figure 2.2: Optimal outsourcing strategies when
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iate at Region III. When firm O outsources to firm
-product
market can be mitigated. Therefore, firm O would outsource to firm C, and firm C would
set a non-negative wholesale price that is higher than what is offered by firm T (i.e.,
. The outsourcing strategy in this region could explain how Philips
caused TPV to reduce its own brand output by outsourcing the production of its monitors
to TPV.
I show in Lemma A1 (in Appendix-A) that

weakly decreases in the capacity

of firm C. Therefore, one might expect that when firm C has a low capacity (Regions I
and II, where firm C can charge a high wholesale price to firm O), instead of using the
capacity to produce for its own product, firm C is better off using all capacity to supply to
firm O so that firms O and C can hold monopolies in the final-product market and in the
component markets, respectively. Interestingly, I find that firm O would not outsource to
firm C in these two regions. This is because, on the one hand, firm C can sell its product
to the customers at a high retail price, and hence, it would require a high wholesale price
product. On the other hand, competition between suppliers C and T provides a limit in
terms of how high a wholesale price firm O is willing to accept. I find that the wholesale
product is higher than the wholesale price that firm O is willing to accept (i.e.,
). Therefore, both firms would forgo the opportunity of holding monopolies in the
component market and in the final-product market, and both would prefer to act as pure
competitors. Moreover, when firm C sells a final product to customers when it has small
capacity, it will price its products high, which in turn will allow firm O to price its
product higher than its price in the monopoly market. Gelman and Salop (1983) showed
similar results, where they found that when the two firms are not supply chain partners
and the new entrant had limited capacity, it was not profitable for the incumbent to hold a
monopoly in the market. I
supply chain partners.

ors are
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At Region II, firm O does not outsource to firm C, even though firm C has some
capacity to produce its own products, but the gain from component sales to firm O would
not compensate for the loss from the reduction in final product sales. Therefore, firm C
would set a high wholesale price (i.e.,

) to discourage firm O from outsourcing

to firm C. This result can explain the market choices of some competitive CMs like
Franz, who prioritize capacity to their own brands and turn down outsourcing contracts
when facing capacity-allocation conflicts (Yan, 2013).
Proposition 2.2 presents the impact of capacity to demand, price and profit for the
case where

. Figure 2.3 illustrates the impact of capacity on demands and prices

(Propositions 2.2a and 2.2b) and Figure 2.4 illustrates the impact of capacity on profit
(Proposition 2.2c).
Proposition 2.2: Define

,

,

, where is a small positive number. When

and

,

a.
and

.

b. Firm i's price may increase in capacity:

.

c.
or
for all
When
while demands would increase. I find that this intuition does not hold when the capacity
of firm C is around

. This is because, as

increases, the strategy changes from the

two firms acting as pure competitors (Region I or Region II) to acting as coopetitors
(Region III). Therefore, firm C would shift some of its capacity to produce components
for firm O, and thus, its demand

decreases and price

increases. Venkatesh et al.

(2006) in Proposition 3 of their paper find that firms would set higher prices under
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coopetition relationships. I extend this finding to a system with limited capacity by
showing that firm C sets a higher price because, in addition to the two firms acting as
coopetitors, firm C uses some of the capacity to produce for firm O and thus produces
fewer units for itself. Firm O also sets a higher retail price

because it shifts from using

a cheaper supplier (firm T) to using a more expensive supplier (firm C), so it sets a higher
retail price in order to maintain the margin.

Figure 2.3:

and price as a function of

When firm O outsources to firm C and firm C has sufficient capacity to produce
for both firms (Region IV), or when firm O outsources to firm T and firm C has sufficient
capacity to produce for itself (Region II), the

ts are not affected by the

capacity level (cf. Figure 2.4). However, when capacity is binding, firm C may be worse
off from having more capacity, even when that capacity can be available for free. This is
because, in Regions I and III, the retail prices of both firms would decrease when firm C
has more capacity, so competition becomes more intense. I find that the impact of a
decrease in retail prices is larger than the impact of an increase in demand, so the profit of
firm C decreases. In other words, selling the extra output requires firm C to lower its
market price which results in lower overall profit. This can be interpreted as the cost of
know
when its capacity increases, firm C cannot prevent the increasing competition by limiting
its output (by hiding its extra capacity from firm O) and thus keeping its market price
high. Osborne and Pitchik (1985) also find that having a limited capacity could be
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beneficial for the small firm as the reduction in competition due to smaller capacity may
offset the lower output levels of the small firm.
Furthermore, the second part of Proposition 2.2c shows that the impact of profitdecreases-in-capacity (Region III) is larger when firms O and C cooperate as supplychain partners than when firms act as competitors only (Region I). This is because firms
would set higher prices under the coopetition scenario than under the competition
scenario. When capacity increases, the decrease in price under the coopetition scenario is
larger than that under the competition scenario, so the decrease in profit is larger. This
finding illustrates the
competitors cooperate as supply-chain partners. One key takeaway is that firms are not
always better off with more capacity, especially when they are coopetitors.

Figure 2.4:
The two products are more substitutable when they are located closer to one
another (

decreases), leading to a more intense competition. Then Proposition 2.3

presents the impact of the degree of competition to the demand of firm C when
Proposition 2.3: When

,f

competition in the final-product market:

(entire Region III).

.
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As expected, demand of a product decreases when competition intensify (in
Regions I, II and IV). However, Proposition 2.3 shows that when the two firms are
supply-chain partners and when firm C has no excess capacity (Region III), the demand
for a product increases, even when the two products become more substitutable (
decreases). This is because

decreases. Therefore,

when capacity level is tight, firm C would
product. Firm C would have more capacity to produce product under its own brand, so it
would set a lower price

for its product, in turn leading to a higher demand

.

In the results presented above, I assume that competition in the final-product
market is low (i.e.,
suppliers (i.e.,

). In this case, firm O would never multi-source to both
is never optimal). This is because firm O will outsource as

many components as possible to firm C if the wholesale price is less than

. Therefore,

the only possible scenario that might lead to a multi-sourcing
the wholesale price such that
firm O is better off to outsource to firm C. However, in Proposition 2.1 I show that firm
C always sells in final-product market even when its capacity is low, so firm C would set
a high wholesale price to deter firm O from buying out its capacity. Thus, firm O would
never multi-source.
Next, I will illustrate in Proposition 2.4 that firm O may multi-source when the
competition between the two products is very intense (

). I present the optimal

strategy in Figure 2.5, and the analytical definition of the six regions are presented in
Appendix-A. I define two new regions for the case where the competition is very intense:
firm O multi-sources from firm C and firm T in Region V, and firm O outsources to firm
C in Region VI. Moreover, in both Regions V and VI firm O holds a monopoly in the
final-product market.
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Figure 2.5: Optimal outsourcing strategies when
Proposition 2.4: When competition between the two products is very intense (

),

a. Firm C does not sell in the final-product market in Regions V and VI.
b. Firm O multi-sources in Region V.
Recall from Proposition 2.1 that when the competition between the two final
products is low (

), firm C would always sell to customers in the final-product

market. However, when the two products are very substitutable (
2.4a shows that firm C might be better off serving

), Proposition
plier and opting not to

sell in the final-product market (cf. Regions V and VI in Figure 2.5). There are two
different reasons behind this strategy.
First, intuitively when firm T

n

cost), firm C can set higher wholesale prices compared to the cases where firm T has low
wholesale price. Then, coupled with the fact that firm C cannot set a high retail price
because of the strong degree of substitutability between the two products, firm C can earn
more profit from selling components to firm O than from selling products in the finalproduct market. In these scenarios (Region VI), firm O holds the monopoly in the finalproduct market, and firm C holds the monopoly in the component market. In this case
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final-product market to avoid high competition and lower retail prices. This is because
when the competition in the final-product market is very intense firm O can increase its
retail price significantly if firm C does not sell in the final-product market compared to
the case where firms compete in the final-product market.
Proposition 2.4b shows that when competition among final products is very
intense there is a region (Region V) where firm O multi-sources its component from
firms C and T. The reason for multi-sourcing is that in Region V firm C does not have
enough capacity
the monopoly in the final-product market can expand its demand by supplying the rest of
its component demand from firm T. The size of the region where firm C does not sell in
the final-product market (Regions V and VI) depends on the degree of competition
between the final products. As competition of the two products intensifies (

decreases),

the sizes of Regions V and VI increases. This is because firms O and C can avoid this
intense competition by being monopolies in the final-product market and in the
component markets, respectively.

2.5
Contract manufacturers sometimes have the proprietary rights to produce the component,
but after the patent has expired, other suppliers can also produce it. For instance,
Qualcomm served as the proprietary supplier of the CDMA chips for cell phone
producers, and
CDMA (Mock, 2005), resulting in an increase of competition in the cell-phone-chip
manufacturing market.
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the impact of competition in the
component market. In particular, in the main model, I assume that the component is not
proprietary, such that firm O has the option of multi-sourcing from multiple potential
suppliers (firms C and T). In this section, I consider a benchmark scenario in which the
component is of a proprietary nature, and firm C is the only supplier that can produce the
component. Firm C deploys one of the following strategies: (1) monopoly

does not
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supply the component to firm O (e.g., sets a very high wholesale price) such that firm C
holds the monopoly in selling the final product, (2) supplier only acts as a supplier for
firm O but does not enter the final-product market, and (3) coopetitor

supplies

components to firm O and sells final products to customers.
When firm C does not supply components to firm O (monopoly), firm O earns
:
(2.7)
s.t.

(2.8)

When firm C supplies components to firm O and does not sell a final product in the finalproduct market (supplier only
(2.9)
s.t.

(2.10)

When firm C sells components to firm O and also sells final products in final-product
market (coopetitor),

profit is:
(2.11)
s.t.

(2.12)

While under the monopoly strategy, firm O
and coopetitor scenarios, firm O

nder the component-supplier

is:
(2.13)

The game sequence under the benchmark is as follows:
1) Firm C decides on its strategy (monopoly, component supplier, coopetitor).
2) If applicable, firm C decides

.

3) If applicable, firm C decides

and firm O decides

.
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I use backward induction to find the equilibrium solutions; the derivation of
equilibrium is presented in Appendix-A. I denote the optimal profit of firm O under the
benchmark to be
Recall that

, and I define the value of competition to firm O as

.

denotes the equilibrium profit of firm O in the main model. Then,

Proposition 2.5 examines how the capacity and competition in the final-product market
affect the value of competition in the component market. (The value of competition from
the perspective of firm C is the reverse of that from the perspective of firm O.)
Proposition 2.5:
a. The value of competition in the component market decreases in capacity:

.

b. The value of competition in the component market decreases in the intensity of
competition in the final-product market:

.

c. Firm O is always better off if there is more than one supplier:

.

Under the benchmark scenario, w
wholesale price increases significantly because the CCM holds the monopoly in the
component market. On the other hand, the wholesale price would be relatively insensitive
to the capacity under the main model because of competition in the component market.
Therefore, the value of competition in the component market is large when capacity
decreases.
When the competing products are highly substitutable (i.e., small

), firm C has

less incentive to allocate its capacity to firm O, so one might expect the value of
competition in the component market to be large. However, I find that the opposite
impact holds.
Consider the case where firm C supplies components to firm O under the
profit is relatively insensitive to the product substitutability under the benchmark
because, when it serves as the proprietary component supplier, firm C would set a
wholesale price to extract as much profit from firm O as possible. On the other hand,
under the main model, the wholesale price would be relatively insensitive to product
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substitutability because of competition in the component market. As firm O stands to gain
more when the product becomes less substitutable under the main model, the value of
competition in the component market increases in M.
Despite the fact that the value of competition might decrease for firm O
or product substitutability, Proposition 2.5c shows that
firm O always prefers to have more than one outsourcing option. This preference relates
to the fact that the availability of alternative outsourcers would provide firm O with more
bargaining power when designing a contract with the supplier.

2.6
In the main model, I have assumed that firm O cannot order excess quantity. However,
-product market by using a
portion of the capacity, thereby mitigating competition in the final-product market, firm
O might have the incentive to order more than its demand. Specifically, in the second
step of the game, firm O decides how much to order from firm C and how much to order
from firm T.
The analysis of this game is similar to the main model, though much more
-quantity constraint. The proofs are available from authors
upon request. In summary, it can be shown that the general structure of the equilibrium
stays the same. Similar to the findings presented in Proposition 2.4a, firm C is better off
not selling in the final-product market since product substitution increases in the presence
of the buy-and-hold option. However, when there is a buy-and-hold option, the degree of
product substitutability that is required for firm C to prefer to drop out of the finalproduct market is lower compared to the main model, where firm O does not have the
buy-and-hold option. This is because firm O does not need to price its products low when
it can have excess order quantity, so it may be better off selling its products for a
monopoly price and keeping the extra components at no cost. Consequently, firm O
would be willing to pay
monopoly in the final-product market. In turn, firm C has a larger wholesale price so it
would not sell in the final-product market even when the products are less substitutable.
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When firm C sells its own product to the end customer, firm O would never
utilize the buy-and-hold option. This is because firm C would set a sufficiently high
wholesale price when selling to end customers, so firm O would outsource to firm T
instead. Moreover, firm O would exercise the buy-and-hold only when firm C has a
relatively large capacity (Region VI) because, otherwise,
be

would always

(Region V). Therefore, the existence of the buy-

and-hold option for firm O would largely affect the area under which firm C is the
supplier only and firm O is single-sourcing from firm C, thus making this strategy
optimal for a larger set of parameters. I show that all of the results in the main model hold
in the presence of the buy-and-hold option.

2.7
In this chapter, I examine the impact of capacity on the optimal channel structure when
the contract manufacturer may have a competing product. Using a game theoretical
approach to study the dynamics of

strategic decisions allows us to better

understand the effect of various fact

factors that might not be

present in single-case or multiple-case study.
I show that capacity limitation, which is a commonly experienced conflict among
contract manufacturers, can have nontrivial impacts. In particular, when firms act as
supply chain partners, the CCM might reduce its own product output in order to fulfill the
Thus, I present an explanation for both prioritizing capacity
to a
and reducing the

such as the strategy used by Franz in the motivating example)
a

competitor (such as the motivating example of TPV technologies). However, the former
strategic move (by Franz) can be justified whenever a firm has limited capacity that can
satisfy its own demand only, and the latter strategy (by TPV technology) becomes more
plausible whenever a firm has a lot of excess capacity to accommodate OBM orders as
well as most of its own demand. Furthermore, I characterize the conditions under which
the OBM might benefit from multi-sourcing its component. I show the competition in the
finalcapacity while outsourcing the rest of the component demand to a third-party supplier.

30

I
capacity increases. Interestingly, I find that the
capacity, and this deterioration becomes more severe when firms are supply-chain
partners. For example, since 2014, LG Display produces the OLED screens used by
OBMs like Apple and also by its own firm, LG Electronics. Due to increasing demand in
electronic markets, LG Display is planning to expand its production capacity to
accommodate both OBMs (e.g., Apple) and its own brand

supply needs

(Fingas, 2015). However, my results show that it might be better for a contract
manufacturer in this example, LG Electronics

to limit the output of its own product in

order to maintain higher market prices and thus reduce market competition. Therefore, in
terms of managerial insights and implications, my results suggest that increasing capacity
level may be harmful to the industry. Finally, I show that, in the component market, the
value of competition to the OBM is small when the two products are highly substitutable.
Moreover, the results of my study provide strategic insights for practicing
managers when their firms compete with a supplier that has limited capacity. In
particular, when there is a need for capacity expansion to reach economies of scale, the
, 2008). However, my results show that
if the competitors can share the capacity, the increase in capacity levels may result in a
more profitable industry rather than a price war. Such insight would increase the
desirability of cooperating with competitors when there is a potential to achieve
economies of scale through increased capacity levels.
I used

but

this model had some limitations. I used a deterministic demand model, so a possible
avenue of future research would be to analytically study the impact of demand
uncertainty on the capacity-allocation problem of a CCM. Moreover, in my model, I
considered only one competitive contract manufacturer that can produce a competitive
product. It would be interesting to consider multiple strategic contract manufacturers,
each with the option of producing their own brand products.
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Chapter 3

3
In this chapter I examine performance-based payment contracts to promote the optimal
use of an optional diagnostic test for newly diagnosed cancer patients. This study is
inspired by three trends: tremendous increases in the cost of new, advanced cancer drugs;
development of new diagnostic tests to allow physicians to tailor treatment to patients;
and changes in healthcare funding models that reward quality care. I model the
interaction between two parties

a healthcare payer and an oncologist, in which the

the payer does not know whether the oncologist takes the optimal course of action (moral
hazard). I show that, in the presence of information asymmetry, an oncologist should
never test all patients, even if the diagnostic test is available for free. Moreover, although
ays benefit
from this private information. I also find that social welfare might increase as a result of
I show that it is not always socially optimal to make a diagnostic test compulsory even if
such a policy can be implemented for free.

3.1
Cancer is the second leading cause of death in the United States, accounting for over
580,000 deaths in 2013 (Center for Disease Control and Prevention 2013). The American
Cancer Society estimates that there will be over 1,680,000 new cancer diagnoses in 2016
(American Cancer Society 2016). Cancer treatment typically consists of a combination of
surgery, radiation therapy, hormone treatment, and chemotherapy. In recent years, cancer
treatment costs have risen dramatically with the development of a number of biologics
and targeted treatments. For example, the cost of a course of therapy with trastuzumab
(Herceptin) for breast cancer is estimated at $30,000 (Hornberger et al. 2005); the cost of
a course of therapy with bevacizumab (Avastin) for colorectal cancer is approximately
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$90,000 (Picard 2012), and other drugs have been developed with a wide range of
monthly costs per patient (Campbell 2015).
In addition to growth in the number and cost of treatment options available, there
has also been growth in the availability and use of personalized medicine, often
implemented through genetic and gene-expression profiling tests, which can help guide
cancer diagnosis and treatment decisions. In some jurisdictions, a KRAS test is required
prior to treatment with cetuximab or panitimuab for colorectal cancer, based on evidence
that these drugs are not effective in patients with mutations in the KRAS gene (DíazRubio et al. 2012). The 21-gene assay for breast cancer (Oncotype Dx) generates a
recurrence score based on the expression of 21 genes. The score is interpreted as the
probability of cancer recurrence within 10 years and is used to guide adjuvant
chemotherapy treatment decisions. In particular, women with a high recurrence score are
advised to undergo adjuvant chemotherapy, whereas women with a low recurrence score
may avoid adjuvant chemotherapy as it provides limited benefits but is associated with
harmful side effects. A gene expression profiling test for cancer of unknown primary (the
Tissue of Origin test) examines the expression of more than 2,000 genes and produces a
15 common types. This test can help to guide treatment decisions by directing treatment
towards the most appropriate agents for a given type of cancer instead of using a general,
non-specific treatment regimen. These diagnostic tests are an important element of
personalized medicine since individualized treatment cannot be prescribed in the absence
of this type of information.
The costs of these tests vary from less than $500 for single-gene tests like KRAS
(Behl et al. 2012) to $4,000 or more for multi-gene tests (e.g., Oncotype Dx costs $4,175
(Ray 2011) and Tissue of Origin costs $3,750 (Tansey 2008)). Use of many of these tests
is supported by clinical guidelines (Allegra et al. 2009, Carlson and Roth 2013) and a
number of health technology assessments (e.g., Hannouf et al. 2012, Nerurkar et al. 2014,
Hannouf et al. 2016). However, the uptake of these advanced tests is low despite
espite solid scientific
evidence and endorsement by oncology societies for multi-gene tests supporting therapy
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decision-making in breast cancer, only a small percentage of women are able to safely
skip chemotherapy through personalized medicine In the United States, 90 percent of
people have insurance plans that cover the Oncotype Dx test, yet only 27 percent of
eligible cancer patients used the test in 2010 (Enewold et al. 2015).
To help manage chemotherapy costs and incentivize physicians to provide highquality care, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has developed a
new funding model called the Oncology Care Model (OCM). The OCM payment scheme
-month episode of treatment that is based on the
average treatment cost of patients with similar health conditions. Under OCM, providers
receive payments based on a fee-for-service (FFS) model where the providers are
compensated based on the volume of services performed. At the end of each treatment
status, if the total cost of treatment is below the target price (Cms.gov 2015). The OCM
thus creates conflicting objectives in managing care: while the target price aims to limit
the treatment cost, the reward payments give physicians the flexibility of choosing more
health status.
The OCM is part of a more general type of payment reform that focuses on
performance-based bundled payments. Several other examples have been developed. For
instance, CMS introduced a 5-year payment program in April 2016 for lower extremity
joint replacement called the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) Model.
Under the CJR model, hospitals will be compensated based on a target price that aims to
cover the total cost of an episode of treatment, defined as the period that starts with an
admission to a participating hospital and ends 90 days post-discharge. Hospitals may also
receive quality incentive payments based on the health outcome of patients. Similarly, the
Cardiac Rehabilitation Incentive Payment Model was introduced by the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) in 2016. Participating hospitals will receive quality
incentive payments as well as a bundled payment for a 90-day care period following
hospital discharge for patients hospitalized for a heart attack or bypass surgery. Recent
studies suggest that there is growing interest in bundled payment models by healthcare
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payers (Japsen 2015, Whitman 2016). Bundled payment models accounted for 15 percent
of insurers spending in 2014 (Evans 2014) and there is evidence that these payment
models have resulted in positive outcomes (Korda and Eldridge 2011).
In this essay, I develop a stylized physician compensation model inspired by the
growing use of advanced diagnostic testing technologies in cancer care. Although
diagnostic tests are not explicitly included in OCM, the growing number of expensive
testing technologies and the need to ensure the appropriate use of these tests suggests a
need to include them in future funding models. Thus, my research explores what a
bundled payment mechanism should look like if diagnostic tests are available. The
central problem analyzed in this chapter was identified in a report by consulting firm
McKinsey and Co., which described one of the barriers to adopting new testing
technologies for personalized medicine as the difficulty of enforcing standard protocols
to ensure that physicians follow through with appropriate patient care based on test
results

.
My model involves interaction between a healthcare payer (payer) who pays for

the test and advanced treatment option (e.g., adjuvant chemotherapy), and an oncologist
(provider) who makes decisions regarding the use of the test and the advanced treatment
for patients. Patients are heterogeneous, with different risks of cancer recurrence. Since
the recurrence probability can only be known if the test is used, patients appear to be
homogeneous members of different risk groups if the test is not used. The payer offers a
payment contract to providers to maximize social welfare, defined as the monetary value
of health outcomes minus the total costs of providing care. Depending on the payment
structure offered by the payer, the provider chooses one of three treatment options: 1)
Treat all patients with an advanced treatment option without ordering the test; 2) Do not
order the test and do not treat with an advanced treatment option; or 3) Order the test and
only treat those patients with advanced treatment option whose recurrence probability is
sufficiently high. While in the main analysis I assume that the provider decides whether
to use the test or not, in some cases the test can be made compulsory (e.g., KRAS);
therefore, in Section 6 I extend my analysis to the case where the test is compulsory for
all patients.
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The contract design problem is complicated by information asymmetry in the
system. First, there are many patient characteristics that are observed by physicians but
are not formally recorded in any clinical or administrative databases held by the payer
(adverse selection). Second, the payer also does not know which factors the physician
considered when making the treatment decision, so the payer does not know whether the
optimal course of action is used by the provider (moral hazard). To incentivize the
provider to use the test whenever it is beneficial and to appropriately follow the
recommendation of the test results whenever the test is used, the payer offers a menu of
contracts consisting of a fixed payment per episode of treatment, and reward payments
that are based on patients health and on whether or not treatment is applied.
The underlying problem has a structural novelty in that the
use an advanced treatment option is conditional on his decision to order the diagnostic
test. Therefore, finding the optimal menu of contracts is a challenging problem as the
I construct the optimal
provider.
My study yields several interesting findings that have policy implications. First, I
show how the payer can design contracts such that the provider may not be able to take
advantage of his private information. In this optimal contract structure, the payer should
incorporat

contracts. In particular, the payer

should offer reward payments for not treating certain types of patients with an advanced
treatment option. This finding underlines empirical evidence on over-prescription of
chemotherapy treatment (Smith and Hillner 2010
not always depend on using the most expensive technology available. Furthermore, it
shows that the advent of new diagnostic tests necessitates new reimbursement models
because current payment models do not account for treatment choices made by the
providers.
Second, if the test is relatively inexpensive, then it may seem natural that the
provider should order the diagnostic test for all patients. Interestingly, when the test is
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optional and there is imperfect information flow between the payer and the provider, I
find that the payer should motivate the provider to only test certain types of patients, even
if the diagnostic test can be available for free. This is in agreement with empirical
evidence showing that some new technologies might not be cost-effective even if they
can be acquired for free (Davis 2014, Davis and Akehurst 2016). However, under
complete information it is optimal to test all patients when the test cost is sufficiently
low. This result highlights the importance of information flow in the healthcare system
and provides the first step in estimating the value gained by enhancing administrative
databases held by the payer.
Third, I find that an increase in reputational concerns and altruistic behavior of a
provider may increase social welfare. This result is inline with the inconsistent evidence
regarding the impact of malpractice pressure on healthcare systems (Avraham and
Schanzenbach 2010, Reyes 2010, Cotet 2012, Lakdawalla and Seabury 2012, Dai et al.
2016, Montanera 2016). Thus, I provide further support for Montanera (2016) who
argues that tort reform, even if successful at reducing malpractice pressure, is not a
achieving both cost reductions and quality improvements for
all patients.
Finally, I show that it is not always socially optimal to make a diagnostic test
compulsory even if there is no cost to implement such a policy. While compulsory testing
could eliminate adverse selection, it does cause unnecessary testing of patients who are
very likely to benefit (or not benefit) from an advanced treatment option based on their
pre-test evaluation. Thus, this finding suggests that even if a diagnostic test is
recommended by the guidelines, it might be better to leave the decision about ordering
the test to the judgment of physicians instead of making the test compulsory for the
whole population.

3.2
My study is primarily related to the stream of literature that considers design of
mechanisms (e.g., performance-based payment models) for healthcare systems. For
example, there are studies that design performance-based contracts to improve patient
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access to care (e.g., Jiang et al. 2012, Jiang et al. 2016, Savva et al. 2016). Jiang et al.
(2012) consider contracts between a payer and a healthcare provider that serves a
heterogeneous patient pool using an online appointment-scheduling system. They
propose a threshold penalty-payment scheme to reach a desired patient waiting time
(performance measure). Jiang et al. (2016) and Savva et al. (2016) study performancebased incentives when there is direct competition among providers. In these studies,
performance measure is included in the proposed contracts. However, in my study,
performance measure that is a
included as a contract term. Fuloria and Zenios (2001) also design performance-based
, which was
established in 1973 to provide affordable dialysis care for ESRD patients. They assume
that all patients are homogeneous with the same probability function of experiencing
complications or death after treatment. My work differs in that I study heterogeneous
patients that can only be sorted using a diagnostic test. Finally, Gupta and Mehrotra
(2015) study the proposer selection problem of CMS for its
. Similar to my study, they find coordinating mechanisms to align
the incentives of the payer and the provider. However, I focus on the heterogeneous
patient pool visiting a provider that is already a participant of a payment program, while
the providers.
There are also studies in healthcare operations management that analyze a
nostic tests in various healthcare settings.
Motivated by the utilization of cancer screening tests, Yaesoubi and Roberts (2011) study
optimal reimbursement contracts between a payer and a healthcare provider. The provider
is assumed to only care about the cost of treatment, and thus the health outcome of a
patient does not affect the treatment choice of the provider. Conversely, I consider the
case where the provider is concerned about patient health outcome. Moreover, I study
the effects of an optional diagnostic test that can help the provider when deciding on
treatment, whereas in Yaesoubi and Roberts (2011), the use of a particular test is the
. Dai et al. (2016) study the effect of different service
environments (e.g., provide
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-ordering behavior. Their study is focused on general diagnostic tests, such
as MRI or EKG, that are used to identify whether a patient has a disease. In contrast, I
am interested in personalized medicine and diagnostic tests that identify if a patient (who
is already diagnosed with a disease) can benefit from a targeted therapy. Similar to my
s altruistic behavior and reputational concerns when
patients are not properly treated, Dai et al.

s

misdiagnosis concern and show that both over-testing and under-testing are possible
outcomes of these concerns. Finally, Dai et al. (2015) study the use of an optional test on
decision-making of a provider regarding the use of percutaneous coronary intervention
(PCI) for coronary artery disease. Similar to my approach they assume some degree of
altruistic behavior by providers and model it as a conflict of interest between financial
gains and patients health outcome. They show that the incorporation of optional
advanced testing into decision-making might have non-monotonic effects on the use of
PCI depending on the amount of the pro

my study, they
the optional test and do not study the

potential payment systems that might align the incentives of the payer and the provider.
Adida et al. (2016) study the effects that FFS and bundled payment models have
on patient selection and the treatment intensity decisions made by a provider. Similar to
my model they consider a reputational penalty for the provider in case of a treatment
failure. They find that the FFS model would result in overtreatment of patients. Guo et al.
(2016) also compares the FFS model with a bundled payment model in a setting where
patients are sensitive to waiting times. They show that when the patient pool is
sufficiently small the bundled payment model dominates the FFS model in all
performance measures. Similar to my study they find optimal reimbursement policy of a
payer who maximizes the patient welfare. Andritsos and Tang (2015) consider a comanaged situation where both the provider and the patient can exert effort to reduce the
readmission rate. They show that bundled payment outperforms FFS by causing the
provider and the patient to exert more effort to reduce readmission. These studies
investigate incentive problems in healthcare systems in order to compare the outcome of
different payment models, but they do not consider performance-based bundled
payments. In this chapter, I model newly proposed payment models that reward providers

42

for higher quality of care and design performance-based payment contracts that align the
incentives of the payer and the provider while achieving socially optimal treatment
levels. To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to study the use of performance-based
contracts to coordinate the incentives of a healthcare payer and a provider while
examining the impact of an optional diagnostic test on

decision-making

process.

3.3
I consider a system that consists of a payer, a provider, and a pool of newly diagnosed
patients who are eligible for an optional diagnostic test. I extend the analysis to a case
where the diagnostic test is compulsory in Section 6. In this section, I consider a system
profile) and moral hazard (the payer does not know whether or not the treatment that is
recommended by the test result is followed). The provider makes the testing and
treatment decisions, and the payer incentivizes the provider with a payment contract in
order to maximize social welfare. Consistent with current practice for the Oncotype Dx
and Tissue of Origin tests, I assume that the test result is sent directly to the provider. I
assume that the provider incurs the treatment cost (e.g., chemotherapy cost plus costs
associated with administering treatment and monitoring patients) and is compensated via
his contract with the payer, while the test cost is directly billed to the payer. Throughout
the chapter I

an advanced treatment option, such as

targeted therapy, that would be recommended from the results of a diagnostic test. Thus,
whenever I

a

patient with a specific treatment (e.g., chemotherapy or a targeted treatment), but the
patient will still be treated by other means that are appropriate given her pre-test
diagnosis (e.g., hormone therapy or empiric chemotherapy).
The risk profile of the
patients is private information to the provider because the provider is able to make
several observations about each patient that are not known to the payer. An example of
private information is

can influence many factors such as

adherence to medication recommendations and preventive measures to prevent
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recurrence, and thus influence the success of a given treatment recommendation. Other
examples include detailed family history or various risk factors that are disclosed to a
physician but not formally recorded in patient charts. In addition, the results of some lab
administrative databases, the payer may know that a test has been ordered (because of an
associated billing code), but not know the result of the test. A proliferation of new tests,
each with their own reporting standards, will likely exacerbate this problem. For instance,
likely tissue of or
would require customization of existing databases, which may not be a priority for the
payer, particularly if the tests are used for rare conditions. The extent of this source of
information asymmetry will vary among payers depending on the structure of their health
records systems and their sophistication in using the information collected

but even for

a sophisticated payer, the physician will know more about a patient than the payer does.
For this analysis, without loss of generality, I normalize the number of patients of
the provider to one. I assume that patients can be one of two types: high-risk (type- ) and
low-risk (type- ). The recurrence probability (risk score) of typecharacterized by a random variable,
and

with density functions

probability of type- patients is
distribution function

patients is

, with corresponding distributions
and

. Thus, the expected recurrence
. I assume that patients risk

is continuous and strictly increasing on

. Since type-

patients have a higher expected recurrence probability than type- patients, I assume that
for all . The provider can observe the type but does not know a
recurrence probability

s

unless the patient undergoes the test, and ordering the test
provider. The payer only knows the

probability of the patient type to be of type- with probability

, where

I assume that treatment can reduce the recurrence probability to
hazard ratio

.
, where

is small. This assumption is consistent with the use of the 21-gene assay
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for breast cancer where the original validation study found that the difference in the
probability of recurrence for women treated with chemotherapy versus hormone therapy
alone was increasing in the recurrence score (Paik et al. 2006).
The payer offers a menu of contracts

that depends on the patient

type, . The contracts consist of the following three terms: 1) A fixed bundled payment
for an episode of treatment (

), 2) a reward for stable health of treated patients (

3) a reward for stable health of patients who are not treated (
contract (

), and

). The first term of the

) only pays for quantity of treatment and captures the most widely

implemented payment method in different healthcare systems. For example,

can be

interpreted as FFS payment when it covers the cost of an episode of treatment. However,
when

is different from the total cost of the treatment it can be interpreted as a target

price (cf. CJR model) meaning that the provider might receive more or less than the
total cost of the treatment. The next two terms are the performance-based payments that
depend on the health outcome of patients as well as the treatment choice of the provider.
Note that, the payer might be able to benefit from the correlation between the health
outcome of the patients and their risk profile by offering contract payments that are in
line with the most probable outcome corresponding to the patient type, i.e., including
payment terms that reward the recurrence in high-risk patients (Riordan and Sappington
1988). However, these payment structures are impractical and thus are not explored.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the sequence of events.

Figure 3.1: Sequence of events
An episode of treatment costs
recurrence incurs a welfare loss

for each patient. Every untreated patient with

that represents both the opportunity cost and

psychological cost of a patient who is not properly treated. Thus, a payer that maximizes
social welfare has to account for this welfare loss. I assume that this welfare loss will also
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cause a disutility

for the provider.

disutility as being either a result of a loss of reputation (Adida et al. 2016) or disutility
caused by altruism about patients' health (Montanera 2016). I do not argue for either but
instead claim

to be an aggregate value representing both effects. When

adverse patient outcomes cause no disutility for the provider
welfare of his patients. I examine the impact of
There is a net monetary benefit
(i.e., stable health) and

,

i.e., no damage to the

on social welfare in Section 5.

associated with a patient with no recurrence

in case of recurrence,

. Treatment may be associated

with toxicities and adverse events. These cause

to

decrease by , which is the expected cost of adverse events. I assume that
independent of
whereas

is

on the grounds that adverse events are driven by specific drug regimens,

is driven by genetic risk factors.

3.3.1
For each patient, the provider has to decide whether or not to order the test and whether
or not to treat the patient.
Remark 3.1: If the provider orders the test, then the provider chooses a threshold

for

each patient type and only treats patients whose recurrence probability is higher than
this threshold (i.e.,

). This is a result of the recurrence probability being

continuous and monotonic, and the treatment effect being proportional to the recurrence
probability (i.e.,

).

Because the risk score of a patient is only revealed if the test is ordered, the
treatment threshold ( ) decision of the provider is conditional on his test-ordering
decision. I use a binary variable
(

) or not (

to denote whether the provider orders the test

) when patients are of type- . Thus, for a given patient type, the

provider has three options (Figure 3.2): Option 0
test; Option 1

treat patients without ordering the

do not order the test and do not treat patients; and Option 2 order the
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test and treat patients only if their recurrence probability is higher than a treatment
threshold (

).

Figure 3.2:
If the provider chooses to treat patients without ordering the test (Option 0), then
objective function

is:

The first two terms are the fixed bundled payment less the cost for an episode of
treatment and the third term is the reward payment for treated patients with stable health.
If the provider chooses not to order the test and not to treat patients (Option 1), then the
objective function is:

The first term is the reward payment for untreated patients with stable health. The second
term is the provider

recurrence. Finally,

if the provider orders the test (Option 2) and only treats patients if their recurrence score
is above the treatment threshold (

), then

objective function is:
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The first term is the fixed bundled payment less the cost for an episode of treatment for
treated patients. The second and the third terms are the reward payments for untreated
and treated patients with stable health, and the last term is the provider
untreated patients experience a recurrence. A similar approach has been widely used in
concerns regarding the health outcome of the patients (e.g., Dai et al. 2015, Adida et al.
2016, Dai et al. 2016, Montanera 2016).

contracts offered by the payer

, by choosing the treatment choice for

each patient type.

3.3.2
I assu
assuming
the cost of the test is ,

pe- is:

The first two terms are the monetary benefit, less the reward payments to the provider,
for untreated and treated patients with stable health. The third and the fourth terms are the
monetary benefit for untreated and treated patients with recurrence. The fifth and the
sixth terms are the payments for an episode of treatment and the test cost. Note that the
test cost can only be incurred if the provider orders the test, i.e, setting

under

Option 2. The payer decides on the payment contracts that link the two parties. The payer
solves the following program.
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information asymmetry. The

(optimal treatment choice) constraints are moral

hazard incentive constraints to ensure that under the payment contracts

the

. The next two constraints (

and

)

-compatibility constraints. They ensure that
the provider prefers contract

for type- patients to the contract for the other patient type

and thus prevent patient misrepresentation. Note that, if the provider misrepresents a
patient he may also choose to change the treatment choice. This is represented by the
-hand side of the
particular,

and

constraints. In

constraint means that when a provider faces a low-risk patient, he would

be better off choosing the contract that is designed for low-risk patients. Similarly,
constraint ensures that a provider would choose a contract designed for high-risk patients
when he faces a high-risk patient. The last two constraints (
provid

and

) are the

-rationality constraints for each patient type

meaning that the contracts for each patient type result in non-negative payoff for the
provider.
I derive the equilibrium solution following the standard approach (Laffont and
Martimort 2001; Chapter 7, Bolton and Dewatripont 2005; Chapter 6). A similar
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approach is used in other papers that consider both adverse selection and moral hazard
(e.g., Yaesoubi and Roberts 2011, Xiao and Xu 2012, Chick et al. 2016). Specifically,
first, based on the extended revelation principle (Laffont and Martimort 2001; page 258),
I restrict my attention to direct mechanisms where the contracts are a pair of optimal
treatment choices for the two patient types (i.e.,

and

). Next,

because the provider is exposed to higher risk when treating high-risk patients, the
-risk patients to have
higher expected value than the contact for low-risk patients. Therefore, for high-risk
patients the provider would not deviate to the contract designed for low-risk patients, and
thus

will not bind at the optimum. Furthermore, the provider has an incentive to

misrepresent low-risk patients as high-risk patients, so for low-risk patients the provider
can benefit from his private information, and thus
Thus, omitting

and

the constraints

will not bind at the optimum.
and

are binding at the optimum for

all treatment choices of the provider.2
maximization problem where the payer chooses optimal contracts subject to the two
binding constraints (

and

private information (moral hazard), the payer chooses payment terms such that the

The underlying problem is novel in the sense that the provider has two decisions
and the treatment threshold decision is conditional on the test-ordering decision.
whereas the test-ordering decision is public information. Therefore, if the provider does
not order the test for a patient, the payer knows that the provider has chosen to treat or
Given that the treatment threshold decision is conditional on the test-ordering decision,
the provider has nine treatment choices because there are two patient types and three

2

To relate to the literature in the supply chain coordination (e.g.,
et al., 2012; Huang et al
2015; Yan et al., 2015), the provider with a high-risk patient corresponds to the supplier with a lower
capability (high cost or low quality), and vice versa. Therefore, IRL and ICH are binding in those papers,
while IRH and ICL are binding in my study.
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treatment options

per patient type. I

each of the nine treatment choices (cf. Table A.3 in Appendix-B). In the equilibrium
solution, given the model parameters the payer offers a menu of contracts that results in
one of the nine treatment choices with the highest social welfare. The full details on the
derivation of the equilibrium solution are shown in Appendix-B.

3.4
In this section, I present the optimal solution for the system with information asymmetry
(second-best policy). In Subsection 3.4.1, I analyze a system with full information (firstbest policy) to understand the inefficiencies caused by private information of the
provider. I also explain how the proposed payment model outperforms current payment
models in Subsection 3.4.2.
Define

as the critical treatment threshold;

is large when

the treatment adverse effect ( ) or the treatment cost ( ) is large, or when the cost
behavior ( ) is small.
Lemma 3.1 presents a property of the optimal treatment threshold choice of the provider.
Lemma 3.1: When the provider orders the test (

), the optimal treatment threshold

is the same for both patient types and is equal to the critical treatment threshold (i.e.,
).
Lemma 3.1 states that in the optimal solution the payer designs contracts such that
when the provider orders the test he will choose the same treatment threshold for both
patient types that is equal to the critical treatment threshold. This is because the treatment
about treatment and the determination of this marginal patient is independent of the full
distribution of risks for the patient type

. Thus, the change to social welfare from
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For expositional convenience, I define

where
-risk patients

versus low-risk patients. The value

is zero when the distributions of risk of the two

types are identical; it increases in the difference between the two types of patients and in
the treatment threshold . I define the following thresholds:
(3.6)
(3.7)
solves

(3.8)
(3.9)
(3.10)

Threshold

can be interpreted as the maximum willingness-to-pay for the test.

There is a trade-off between the cost of the test and the expected risk to the patients. If
the expected risk to the patients is much lower (higher) than the treatment threshold, then
there is only a small probability that a patient would (would not) require treatment given
the test results. Therefore, as the distance between the expected risk and the treatment
threshold gets larger, the value of the test diminishes because the probability of making
similar treatment decisions with and without the test gets higher.
Lemma 3.2: Define
. If

and
or

, then the patients are never treated.

Lemma 3.2 shows that if the cost of adverse events is sufficiently large (
the treatment is sufficiently costly (

) or

), then the patients would never be treated. In

that case, it is clearly never optimal to order the test. For the remainder of the chapter, I
focus on the interesting region where

and

.
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Proposition 3.1 presents the optimal solution for the system with information asymmetry
(second-best policy), and is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Proposition 3.1: The optimal solution for the system with information asymmetry is one
of the following five cases:
Case 1: For both patient types, do not order the test and treat the patients if and
only if

and

Case 2: For type-L patients, order the test and treat the patients with

; For

type-H patients, do not order the test and treat the patients if and only if
and
Case 3: For type-L patients, do not order the test and do not treat the patients;
For type-H patients, do not order the test and treat the patients if and only if
and

and

Case 4: For type-L patients, do not order the test and do not treat the patients;
For type-H patients, order the test and treat the patients with

if and only if

and
Case 5: For both patient types, do not order the test and do not treat the patients
if and only if
and

Figure 3.3: Optimal treatment decisions for the system with information asymmetry
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Consider the case where the cost of the diagnostic test is sufficiently high, such
that the payer should not motivate the provider to order the test, regardless of the patient
type (Cases 1, 3, 5). In all three cases, the potential benefit of ordering the test
directing treatment to those patients that derive the greatest benefit

that is,

does not justify the

testing cost. It is analogous to public health and health policy guidelines (e.g., for
screening, vaccination, etc.) where the guideline varies in the population prevalence. For
example, one analysis of HIV screening concluded that one-time screening in the general
population might be cost-effective in areas where HIV prevalence exceeds 3.0 percent
(Paltiel et al. 2005).
Next, consider the case where the diagnostic test is relatively inexpensive ( is
small), such that social welfare may increase if the provider orders the test for the patients
(Cases 2, 4). When the critical treatment threshold

is small (Case 2), the provider

should test low-risk patients, and treat them when their recurrence probability is larger
than . However, in Case 2, high-risk patients are expected to have a recurrence risk
larger than the threshold , so the payer should design a contract that motivates the
provider to treat high-risk patients without ordering the test. On the other hand, when the
critical treatment threshold is large (Case 4), the provider should test high-risk patients
and treat them when their recurrence probability is larger than . However, in Case 4,
low-risk patients are expected to have a recurrence risk lower than the critical treatment
threshold, so the payer should design a contract that motivates the provider to neither test
nor treat low-risk patients.
Corollary 3.1 shows how the provider may benefit from his private information.
Corollary 3.1: In Cases 1, 2, and 3, the patient type does not affect t
In Cases 4 and 5, the provider has a higher profit from treating low-risk patients than
from treating high-risk patients.
In Cases 1, 2, and 3, the provider always treats high-risk patients. As a result, the
payer can design a contract for the provider for high-risk patients that (1) does not require
any reward payments (i.e.,

and

), and (2) sets the fixed per patient

treatment bundled payment for an episode of treatment to be the treatment cost (i.e.,
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), leading to the provider having zero profit. Note that this contract structure is
provider with low-risk patients would also have the same profit if he were to pick this
contract (incentive-compatibility constraint -

). As a result, the payer can design a

contract such that the provider would also have zero profit from low-risk patients. Thus,

In Cases 4 and 5, the provider should not always treat high-risk patients, so the
payer must design a contract that includes reward payments for not treating high-risk
patients (i.e.,
provider (

). While treating high-risk patients will have no profit for the
is binding), the provider would have a positive profit when picking this

contract for low-risk patients. This is because not treating low-risk patients with the
advanced treatment option has less risk for the provider. Therefore, to prevent the
provider from misrepresenting low-risk patients, the payer has to incentivize the provider
by offering a profit larger than that offered for high-risk patients (i.e., information rent).
In particular, the provider would have zero profit from high-risk patients in both cases,
but the provider would have profit
patients. (Recall that
argument of

in Case 4, and

in Case 5 from low-risk

is

is in Case 4 because the provider does not treat high-risk patients with

recurrence risk smaller than , and the argument of

is 1 in Case 5 because the provider

never treats high-risk patients, which is equivalent to setting the treatment threshold to
one.)
Corollary 3.2 formally defines test cost thresholds beyond which it is never
optimal to use the test.
Corollary 3.2: In the equilibrium solution, there exists an upper bound for the test cost
such that
if

then test is never ordered for high-risk patient type, and

if

then test is never ordered for either patient type, and
.
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Corollary 3.2 shows that regardless of the risk level of the patients, there is a level
for test cost (

) beyond which it never makes sense to use the test. It is intuitive

that a threshold for the test cost exists, since there is a trade-off between the cost of the
test and the value of the test in terms of improved treatment decisions. However, it may
seem counterintuitive that this threshold is higher for low-risk patients (i.e.,
). This is because in Case 4, the payer incurs information rent when motivating
the provider to test high-risk patients (cf. Corollary 3.1). Therefore, ordering the test for
high-risk patients will increase social welfare only when the test cost is low. On the other
hand, in Case 2, the information rent is zero, and thus it is optimal for the payer to
motivate the provider to test low-risk patients even at higher test cost amounts.
Corollary 3.3 presents a property of the optimal contracts.
Corollary 3.3: All payment and reward terms are non-negative in the optimal contracts.
The payer can offer a contract with non-negative payment terms as long as the
provider gets reward payments for stable health of patients who are not treated (i.e.,
). This is because the provider incurs a cost related to his reputation and his
altruistic behavior when a recurrence happens to untreated patients, so the provider has an
incentive to over-treat patients. The proposed contracts counteract this by compensating
the provider for stable health of untreated patients. Thus, this result highlights the
necessity of incentivizing the provider based on his treatment choice (such as
incentivizing for not prescribing an episode of chemotherapy treatment for breast cancer
patients). Having non-negative payments is a desirable feature of contract design in
healthcare applications because negative payments might be impossible to implement in
practice and could cause additional incentive problems. A similar issue has been noted in
other papers on the topic (Yaesoubi and Roberts 2011, Chick et al. 2016).
Note that when the reward payments are zero (i.e.,
contracts are simple bundled payments (i.e.,

), the resulting

that only pay for the quantity of the

treatment without any consideration of the quality of the treatment. These types of
contracts are similar to the commonly used FFS payment models. I show that when it is
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optimal to use the diagnostic test (Cases 2 and 4) the optimal contracts cannot be of this
form. Consequently, the advent of new diagnostic tests makes current reimbursement
models that only reward the intensity of work sub-optimal and necessitates development
of alternative reimbursement models such as performance-based bundled payment
models.
Corollary 3.4: Under the payment scheme proposed in this section, in the equilibrium of
a system with information asymmetry it is never optimal to test patients from both patient
risk profiles, even when the test is free (i.e.,

).

Corollary 3.4 is true for all optimal cases presented in Proposition 3.1. In Case 2,
where is relatively small (Figure 3.3), the cost of adverse events and treatment cost are
relatively sm
patients. In this case, the provider treats high-risk patients without ordering the test;
accordingly, as stated in Corollary 3.1, the provider will have zero profit from treating
both patient types. If the provider were to test high-risk patients, the test results might
suggest that a high-risk patient does not need to be treated; therefore, the provider would
expect to have a disutility in case of a recurrence. This will require having higher-valued
contract payment terms for high-risk patients if the provider were to order the test in Case
2. Following higher-valued contracts for high-risk patients, to keep the provider from
misrepresenting low-risk patients, the payer needs to offer higher-valued contracts for
low-risk patients as well. As a result, in order to avoid the additional costs generated
through higher-valued contract terms, in Case 2 the payer should not motivate the
provider to order the test for high-risk patients.
In Case 4, the cost for a recurrence in untreated patients is relatively small, and
the provider neither tests nor treats low-risk patients. If the provider were to test low-risk
patients, there is a small probability that the test suggests a low-risk patient to be treated.
However, the savings to the cost related to treating low-risk patients (as it might be
suggested by the test) does not justify higher payment terms that is required to motivate
the provider to test low-risk patients. Thus, in Case 4 the payer should not motivate the
provider to test low-risk patients, even when the test is free. In Appendix-B I illustrate
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how testing patients from both risk profiles always results in lower value for the payer
regardless of the difference between the distributions of the two types of patients.

3.4.1

Full information

To examine whether the finding of Corollary 3.4 is due to decentralized decision-making
or information asymmetry, I consider a system where there is a perfect information flow
between the payer and the provider (first-best policy). The derivation of equilibrium of
this system is presented in Appendix-B, and the equilibrium solution is illustrated in
Figure 3.4. The optimal treatment threshold in a system with perfect information is equal
to the critical treatment threshold (
profile and thus is not affected by information asymmetry in the system. Unlike the
system with information asymmetry (Proposition 3.1), under complete information there
is a new optimal case (Case 6) where the payer should motivate the provider to order the
test for both patient types. This occurs when the test cost is sufficiently low. This is
because, in the full information scenario, social welfare is only affected by the health
outcome of patients and not by private information of the provider. In the full information
scenario, only a patient that can benefit from treatment is treated. However, when the
provider has private information, not all patients who require treatment will be treated
and not all the treated patients will benefit from the treatment. This finding illustrates the
importance of information flow in a healthcare system in order to reduce the
inefficiencies caused by the information asymmetry.
Remark 2: The highest willingness-to-pay for the test in the system with full information
(firstwillingness-to-pay for the test in the system with information asymmetry (

). This is

because in Case 2 the provider does not benefit from his private information and thus the
-to-pay for the test is not affected by the information asymmetry.
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Figure 3.4: Optimal treatment decisions for the system with full information

3.4.2

Alternate payment models

I also compare the proposed payment model with two other arrangements that are similar
to currently implemented payment models. The derivation of equilibrium for these
payment models are available from authors upon request.
First, I analyze the performance of a single performance-based payment contract
that is offered to both patient types (i.e.,

) in a system with information

asymmetry. This is similar to the OCM payment model. Under a single contract the payer
cannot motivate the provider to treat each patient type differently. Therefore, the optimal
treatment choices are Cases 1, 5 and 6. Note that, unlike in the full information scenario,
in the presence of information asymmetry it is costly for the payer to test both patient
types (Case 6) and thus this payment structure is always weakly dominated by the
proposed payment model (i.e.,

).

Second, I analyze an alternative model where the payer offers a menu of contracts
in which reward payments are only tied to the health outcome of a patient (i.e.,
). This is similar to the CJR payment model where a risk stratification
methodology is used to set different target prices for different patient types. The optimal
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treatment choices under this model are qualitatively similar to the 5 cases presented in
Figure 3.3. However, the payment model that I propose can better utilize the optional
diagnostic test by better managing the inefficiency in the system because by
incorporating the treatment choice of the provider into the payment terms the payer can
further reduce the information rent in Case 4. Both contract structures analyzed in this
section have inferior performance to the proposed payment model, and hence emphasize
the importance of development of alternative reimbursement models for different
healthcare systems given the availability and use of personalized medicine.

3.5
In this section, I examine how social welfare is affected by treatment characteristics and

For expositional convenience, I define:
(3.11)
Proposition 3.2 examines how social welfare is affected when untreated patients
experience a recurrence.
Proposition 3.2:
a) Social welfare increases when the welfare loss of an untreated patient with
recurrence has higher impact on the provider (i.e.,

increases) if and only if

and

.

b) Social welfare always decreases when the welfare loss of an untreated patient with
recurrence ( ) increases.
One might expect that, due to a more restrictive participation constraint and the
resulting overtreatment of patients, social welfare cannot increase when the provider is
3.2.a
formally states that this intuition does not always hold. In particular, when the provider
does not treat low-risk patients but uses the test for high-risk patients (Case 4), social
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welfare might increase as reputational concern and altruistic behavior of the provider
increases. This result arises because when

increases, the provider treating high-risk

patients, in order to decrease his risk exposure, would treat patients with higher
probability (i.e.,

increases), which causes a decrease in the difference in the payments

between low-risk and high-risk patient types. This allows the payer to design a contract
such that the surplus utility for the provider treating low-risk patients to be smaller,
Note that, this is only true when the expected recurrence probability of low-risk patients
is sufficiently small that it results in a higher surplus utility for the provider when treating
low-risk patients. The higher the surplus utility of the provider, the higher the potential
gain for social welfare. Another interpretation for this finding that the social welfare
might increase as

increases could be that when

is large, the provider becomes

completely altruistic or has sufficiently high reputational concerns that there is reduced
need to incentivize the provider through the reimbursement mechanism. Proposition 3.2.a
is illustrated in Figure 3.5 using parameters listed in Table 3.1.
Proposition 3.2.b shows that I cannot observe the same impact on social welfare
when the welfare loss of an untreated patient with recurrence ( ) increases. This is
because an increase in the welfare loss of a patient has a direct negative impact on social
welfare and cannot be compensated for by reducing the surplus utility of the provider.

Figure 3.5: Social welfare as a function of

multiplier in Case 4
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Table 3.1: Parameter estimations for numerical examples
Model parameter

Estimated value

Source

Cost for an episode of treatment ( )

$30,000

Hornberger et al. (2005)*

Treatment adverse events ( )

$19,000

Hornberger et al. (2005)

Monetary benefit from stable health ( )

$100,000

Shiroiwa et al. (2010)

Monetary benefit from recurrence ( )

$60,000

Hornberger et al. (2005) §

Test cost ( )

$4,175

Ray (2011)

0.7

Assumption

Probability of type-L (

)

Type-L patient distribution

Assumption ¶

Type-H patient distribution

Assumption ¶

* Estimates of adjuvant chemotherapy costs vary depending on the type of regimen used. I estimate the cost
of a treatment episode per course of trastuzumab.
-month period after an
episode of treatment, I only consider willingness-to-pay for one additional quality-adjusted life-year (QALY)
gained.
§ Quality of life would drop to 0.7 when recurrence is stable, and to 0.5 when recurrence is progressive (base
value 0.98). I use the average value of 0.6 to represent the average willingness-to-pay for QALY of patients
with recurrence.
¶ These distributions are assumed for illustrative purposes. I conducted experiments with other distributions
and obtained qualitatively similar results.

Lastly, the impact of changes in treatment adverse effect , treatment cost and
hazard ratio

are intuitive and formally stated in Proposition 3.3.

Proposition 3.3: All else equal, the payer is always worse off as the treatment becomes
less desirable (i.e., increase in , , or ), and this effect of treatment characteristics on
the social welfare is always larger when the treatment threshold is relatively small.

3.6
There is a wide diversity in guidelines and recommendations for new diagnostic tests. In
addition, many major guidelines are only updated every few years meaning that
guidelines may lag technical developments. For instance, the Oncotype DX test is
recommended by the American Society of Clinical Oncology and the U.S. National
Comprehensive Cancer Network guidelines to be part of the routine practice for early
stage breast cancer patients but not required as part of treatment (Ragaz 2010 B). Some
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not recognized by any guidelines and the use of
decision. Other tests are compulsory; for example, KRAS test must be performed before
treatment with cetuximab or panitimuab for colorectal cancer in Ontario.
In this section, I assume that the payer might make the use of diagnostic tests
compulsory and implement a mechanism to verify test results before reimbursing
treatment. I assume that in making the test compulsory the payer incurs a verification cost
to gather and/or interpret the results

otherwise there would still be a problem with

asymmetric information.
The
(3.12)
s.t

Program (3.12) is the modified version of the program (3.5) in the main model.
The main difference is that there is no adverse selection because the payer acquires
patient information and the test
However, I assume that there is still moral hazard because the payer cannot impose a
treatment choice, as recommended by the test result, to the provider. Since the test is
compulsory the provider always orders the test (i.e.,

). Lemma 3.3 presents the

region in which the payer can improve social welfare by making the test compulsory.
Lemma 3.3: Define
. Then,

if and only

if:
and
Or
and

;

63

Proposition 3.4: It is not always socially optimal to make a diagnostic test compulsory
even if such a policy can be implemented for free (i.e.,

).

Figure 3.6: Compulsory test versus Optional test when
Proposition 3.4 is illustrated in Figure 3.6. The shaded area in Figure 3.6 is the
region where social welfare is higher when the test is compulsory. To make it easier to
compare with the original case where the test is optional, I superimposed the shaded area
on top of the graph from Figure 3.3 using the same scale on the y-axis. Figure 3.6 shows
that while making the diagnostic test compulsory removes the adverse selection, even if
the payer can implement this policy for free (i.e.,

) it is not always optimal to do

so. This is because the test result does not have much value for patients whose expected
recurrence probability is higher than the optimal treatment threshold ( ). Thus when is
small, if the test is used for all patients, the payer pays for a test that might only change
the treatment choice for a small group of patients. However, the compulsory testing
policy becomes more effective when the optimal treatment threshold is relatively large,
such that there is a higher probability for patients to have recurrence score below the
treatment threshold and thus a diagnostic test is needed to eliminate unnecessary
treatment of low-risk patients.
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Corollary 3.5: There exists an upper bound for the test cost such that if

it

is never optimal to make the test compulsory.
Corollary 3.5 formally shows the maximum test cost beyond which it is never
optimal to make the test compulsory. However, as the verification cost for
implementation of the policy increases, the shaded region in Figure 3.6 will shift down
and compulsory testing will be optimal in a smaller region. Therefore, I can argue that
while the maximum verification cost that justifies the compulsory testing depends on the
test cost ( ), this threshold cannot be larger than the maximum test cost that makes the
compulsory test optimal when

(Lemma 3.3).

3.7
In this chapter I examined optimal design of contracts between a payer and a provider
when an optional diagnostic test can be used to predict the benefits of an advanced
treatment option. Following the general framework of OCM, the contracts include reward
payments based on the health of patients at the end of a review period. The provider has
private information abo
or not the optimal course of action is used (moral hazard).
My research provides evidence for the necessity of developing alternative
payment models; for the importance of enhancing payer
of tort reform on social welfare; and on the benefits of implementing compulsory testing
policy. However, this essay is based on a stylized mathematical model with several
limiting assumptions. While it is common to only study two types in systems with
adverse selection (e.g.,
Xu 2012, Saghafian and Chao 2014, Yan et al. 2015) the analysis for multiple types can
be derived using similar methodology (see Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). In this case,
there will be multiple perceived risk distributions for patients (i.e.,
where

is the distribution for the patients with the lowest risk and

is the distribution for the patients with the highest risk). The payer will offer a menu of
-compatibility and
individual-rationality constraints. The provider will receive a zero profit from treating
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patients with highest risk

, and the provider might have a positive surplus for all

other patient types (information rent). The challenging part of the derivation is to reduce
the incentive-compatibility constraints because the provider might have an incentive to
misrepresent the patients from higher-risk distributions as patients from lower-risk
distributions. However, given the structure of my findings, I expect that the main results
of my study (such as non-negative contract terms and not using the test for all patient
types even if it was free) will continue to hold when there are multiple types.
Generalization of the underlying problem to other testing technologies may require
explicit modeling of the sensitivity and specificity of the tests. I assumed that there is
only one provider with a fixed number of visiting patients. Thus, using the proposed
payment model, the payer cannot

in a single

agent system with private information. However, if patients have multiple options when
deciding on which provider to visit, then a fruitful avenue of future research would be to
consider competition among multiple providers. In such a competitive setting, the payer
might be able to absorb all the information rent of for any treatment choice of the
provider (see Cremer and McLean 1988, Demski and Sappington 1984).
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Chapter 4

4
4.1
Hip and knee replacements are the most common inpatient surgery for Medicare patients
in the United States. The total cost for surgery, hospitalization, and recovery can vary
dramatically among providers. For example, the cost of a total knee replacement
procedure could range from $16,772 to $61,585 across different providers (Casey, 2015).
The average cost for a total hip replacement procedure follows similar trends. In 2014,
there were more than 400,000 hip and knee replacements procedures, costing more than
$7 billion in hospitalization expenses alone. These procedures often require lengthy
recovery and rehabilitation periods that increase the cost of the procedure. Demand for
these procedures is expected to grow significantly over the next 10 years, to over 4
million by 2030 an increase of 174% (Froemke et al., 2015). Despite the high volume
of these surgeries, the quality and costs of care still vary greatly among providers. For
instance, the rate of complications (e.g., infections, implant failures, etc.) after surgery
can be more than three times higher at some facilities compared to others. These
complications increase the chances that a patient may be readmitted to the hospital, which
will further increase costs and may also reduce quality.
Consequently, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) introduced
a five-year pay-for-performance program starting in April 2016 for lower extremity joint
replacement (LEJR) called the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) model.
Under the CJR model, hospitals will be compensated based on the total cost of an episode
of treatment, defined as the period beginning with admission of an LEJR patient to a
participant hospital and ending 90 days after discharge. This time period is long enough
to cover the complete period of recovery for most patients. Each episode includes all
related items and services paid under Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) model, such as
long-term care hospital services, inpatient rehabilitation facility services, and skilled
nursing facility services (Cms.gov 2015).
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The CJR model is a retrospective bundled payment model whereby, prior to the
start of each performance year, CMS provides participant hospitals with a target price
that is the expected sum of expenditures of all parties. Within the performance year, CMS
continues to pay all parties involved in the treatment of a patient according to an FFS
model, whereby services are paid based on claims from providers. At the end of the
performance year, the total expenditure will be adjusted according to the pre-specified
target price by penalizing or rewarding the hospital. The target price will be adjusted
-specific spending and regional
spending for LEJR episodes (The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
2015).
Following completion of a CJR model performance year, participant hospitals that
have actual episode spending below the target price and achieve a minimum acceptable
quality score will receive a reward payment from Medicare for the difference between the
target price and actual episode spending. Hospitals with LEJR episode spending that
exceeds the target price will be financially responsible and must pay back the excess
expenditure to Medicare. CMS expects the five-year program to yield $153 million in net
savings (Dickson and Evans, 2015).
Even though a target price and associated reward or penalty are offered to
hospitals, other providers involved in LEJR episodes of care throughout the performance
year will be paid under existing Medicare FFS payment systems. The goal is to give
hospitals a financial incentive to work with providers to coordinate care (HHS 2015).
Therefore, participant hospitals can enter into contracts with collaborating providers and
suppliers who provide services to the patient during an episode of treatment. A
participant hospital may share with other providers the reward payment received from
Medicare as a result of reduced episode spending and the
The hospital may also share financial accountability (i.e., penalties) with other providers
for increased episode spending (CMS, 2015). The CJR model thus shifts the risk of
excess cost to hospitals, and incentivizes hospitals to arrange agreements with other
providers to coordinate care. Accordingly,

s
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and losses from total cost of treatment with other providers in a way that motivates the
providers to reduce their cost while achieving the required quality of care.
In this chapter, I am investigating three questions regarding the impact of a target
price bundled payment model on careview, what is the best way to structure a gain-sharing agreement, whereby each hospital
shares a portion of its reward or penalty with the provider(s)? To address this question, I
study gain-sharing agreements,
of care, to coordinate care and reach the desired health quality and cost savings by the
hospitals. I model a hospital and a provider that provide care for a specific procedure to
patients. The hospital decides the portion of the reward or penalty to be shared with the
provider. Then, the hospital and the provider decide on their respective cost-reduction
efforts that would reduce the total cost of treatment.
affect
-reduction efforts and the total expenditure? To answer this question, I
investigate the impact of the gain-sharing agreements on the outcomes of interest when
compared to some benchmark scenarios where there is no gain-sharing agreement
between the hospital and the provider.
Third, what are the implications of target price bundled payment models for the
payer? I provide practical guidance for the payer in anticipation of the percentage of
savings and the savings sensitivity to the FFS payments and cost-reduction efficiency of
the hospital and the provider.
My research yields several interesting results. First, I show that when there is a
gain-sharing agreement between the hospital and the provider, the provider may be better
off when the target price is low; this is because when the target price is low, the hospital
needs the provider to exert effort to reduce the total treatment cost as it is more efficient
for the provider to reduce the cost of its procedure. Furthermore, I show that despite the
fact that it is easier for a provider to reduce its costs, the hospital might exert more costreduction effort than the provider because the hospital would rather exert some effort inhouse than share more of the reward with the provider.
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In the CJR model, CMS uses a discount factor, applied to the initial treatment
cost, to determine the target price. However, I show that the payer can lower its total
spending by imposing a target price on the hospital, even when the payer sets the target
price equal to the current treatment cost of a patient under the FFS model, because the
potential reward payment would incentivize the hospital and the provider to reduce their
respective treatment costs. Further, I demonstrate that, under a target price bundled
payment model, using a gain-sharing agreement is a win-win-win scenario for the payer,
the hospital and the provider. At the same time, I also note that if the payer does not
properly set the target price, it might not incentivize the hospital to arrange gain-sharing
agreements with the provider, and to exert all the cost savings in-house instead.
I illustrate that a target price bundled payment model would be more effective in
healthcare settings where there is greater asymmetry between the hospital and the
-reduction efficiency, because in networks with higher asymmetry in the
ability to reduce costs, there is an increased need to align the incentives of healthcare
providers to coordinate care. Finally, I show that changing the FFS payments to reach
higher savings through target price bundled payment might negatively impact the quality
of care.
This chapter is organized as follows. I first present the relevant literature in
Section 4.2. Next, I introduce the status quo FFS model in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, I
present the outcome of a bundled payment model where the hospital does not enter into a
gain-sharing agreement with the provider. I also introduce a benchmark centralized
system where there is no money transfer between the hospital and the provider in section
4.4. I analyze gain-sharing agreements in Section 4.5. To understand the implications of a
target price bundled payment model to the payer, I perform numerical analysis on the
equilibrium solutions in Section 4.6. Finally, concluding remarks and the study
managerial insights are found in Section 4.7.

4.2
This study is primarily related to the stream of literature that considers bundled payment
models. For example, Gupta and Mehrotra (2015) study

proposer selection
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problem for its
coordinating mechanisms set by the payer to optimally incentivize and select providers to
participate in the bundled payment program. However, I focus on hospitals that already
participate in C
study the effects that FFS and bundled payment models have on patient selection and the
treatment intensity decisions made by a provider. Similar to my model, they compare the
outcomes of the FFS model with those of the bundled payment model. They find that the
FFS model would result in overtreatment of patients. Guo et al. (2016) also compare the
FFS model with a bundled payment model in a setting where patients are sensitive to wait
times. They show that when the patient pool is sufficiently small, the bundled payment
model is superior to the FFS model in all performance measures. Andritsos and Tang
(2015) consider a co-managed situation where both the provider and the patient can exert
effort to reduce the readmission rate, and conclude that bundled payment outperforms
FFS by causing the provider and the patient to exert more effort to reduce readmission.
These studies investigate incentive problems in healthcare systems in order to compare
the outcome of different payment models, but they only consider a single provider that
will receive the bundled payment. Contrastingly, in this study, I model bundled payments
that cover the total treatment cost of patients who require procedures from a hospital and
a provider. I investigate how the hospital can use gain-sharing agreements to coordinate
care and optimally use the bundled payment to incentivize the provider.
My research closely relates to research on gain-sharing and risk-sharing
agreements. For example, Barros (2011) studies the interactions between a
pharmaceutical company and a payer with and without a risk-sharing agreement. He
assumes patients respond successfully to the drug only with some probability, and the
price for the drug is set by the drug manufacturer. He then shows that depending on when
a risk-sharing agreement is negotiated (i.e., before or after the price has been set for the
drug), the agreement may increase or decrease social welfare. Although I incorporate the
probabilistic health outcome of a patient, in my study,
depends on both the hospital

-reduction efforts. Zhang et al.

(2011) study a price-volume agreement between a drug manufacturer and a payer in the
presence of asymmetric information on demand. The authors consider a one-period
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problem in which the unit sales price and the rebate rate are offered by the payer to the
manufacturer. Mahjoub et al. (2013) study risk-sharing agreements between a drug
manufacturer and a healthcare payer to manage uncertainties regarding the cost and
effectiveness of drugs. They model a risk-sharing agreement in which a proportion of
total sales is rebated to the payer. They investigate the conditions under which the
manufacturer will make a profit. These studies analyze the coordination of a
generated through direct sales. In my study, the hospital and the provider can achieve the
required cost savings and quality of care only through collective effort.
There are also papers that study supply chain coordination through gain-sharing
agreements. For example, Corbett and DeCroix (2001) study a supply chain with a
supplier and a customer where the consumption of indirect materials can be saved by
both the supplier and the customer. They compare a variety of contracts, including joint
investment and shared-savings contracts, in which both parties would benefit from any
reduction in consumption. They show that such shared-savings contracts can always lead
to higher channel profits, but not necessarily to lower consumption. In Corbett and
study, as in my study, the total cost depends on the collective effort of
the providers to reduce the total cost. However, I study a scenario where both total cost
and health quality depend on the collective effort of the hospital and the provider.
Iida (2012) studies a single manufacturer that is exposed to probabilistic demand.
The manufacturer decides on the quantity to produce, and the final product consists of
components that are supplied from

suppliers. The production cost of the final product

depends on an
effort to reduce the production cost of each component. They develop effort-sharing
agreements by which the parties share the benefits of cooperative cost reduction, and
effort-compensation agreements that compensate the parties for the costs of their
respective efforts.

, where each party receives a

reward based on its own cost savings, I analyze a system where the collective cost
savings can be distributed among the parties involved.
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Bernstein et al. (2015) study a decentralized assembly line consisting of a buyer
and many independent suppliers. The components are assembled into a finished product,
which is sold to the downstream market with a deterministic demand. Suppliers can
invest in process-improvement activities to reduce the fixed production costs. The
assembler establishes a knowledge-sharing network that is modeled as a cooperative
game. Bernstein et al. (2015) identify and compare various cost allocation mechanisms
that are feasible in the cooperative game, and show that the optimal system investment
levels can be achieved only when the most efficient supplier receives the incremental
benefits of the cost reduction achieved by other suppliers due to the knowledge transfer.
Notably, these studies have only one target outcome

that is, the production cost

while

in my study, the hospital must achieve a minimum care quality threshold in order to be
eligible for the reward payment.

4.3
First, I analyze a status quo system where there is no mechanism in place to coordinate
care. I model a hospital and a provider that receive FFS payments from a payer. I assume
that FFS payments cover a profit margin

on the treatment cost incurred by each party.

There is a pool of patients who will undergo a treatment that requires procedures
from both the hospital and the provider. The hospital is responsible for procedure
the provider is responsible for procedure . Let

and

, and

be the cost of the

procedures by each party. Without loss of generality, I normalize the number of treated
patients in a performance year to one.
Both the hospital and the provider can reduce the cost of their respective
procedures by exerting effort. Let

,

, denote the effort exerted by each party

to decrease the cost of its respective procedure. Therefore, the total cost of treatment for
each patient is a function of individual effort (i.e.,
linear and decreasing in effort, such that

). I assume cost is
where

represents

the initial cost of the respective procedure for the hospital and the provider before any
cost-reduction effort. Because each party undertakes different parts of the treatment, the
cost function of the hospital is different from the cost function of the provider, and thus
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the effect of cost-reduction effort is different as well. I assume that it is costlier for the
hospital (rather than the provider) to reduce its costs (i.e.,

) a reasonable

assumption since the hospital pays for two large and inelastic components of the
treatment (the implant and physician salaries), and must also cover significant fixed
overhead costs, whereas the provider may reduce its cost by switching between available
resources (e.g., using forced walking instead of continuous motion machines for rehab, or
changing nursing hours per patient day). Thus, most of the savings can be reached
through post-procedure healthcare services, consistent with Saxena (2016). Without loss
of generality, I
implies

), which
. To incorporate diminishing returns, let

be the cost of effort

exerted by each party. As a result, under the FFS model,
written as follows:

:

The first part of the equation is the total profit from FFS payments, and the second part is
the cost of the cost-redu
are decreasing in the cost-reduction effort because in the FFS model, there is no incentive
to reduce the procedure cost. Accordingly, under the FFS model, no cost-reduction effort
will be exerted (i.e.,

), resulting in

with the total status quo treatment cost of

and
.

4.4
To reduce the total spending, the payer can impose a bundled payment for total treatment
cost to motivate the hospital and the provider to exert cost-reduction effort. I analyze a
target price bundled payment model based on the CJR structure. In this scheme, for the
treatment of each patient, there is an upper bound

, representing the target price for the

total cost of treatment, above which the hospital is penalized for the extra cost. The
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hospital will also receive a reward payment when the treatment cost is below the target
price, so I define total savings ( ) of the system as the difference between the target price
and the total cost of treatment (i.e.,

).

In the CJR model, the hospital is eligible for a reward payment only if all
providers achieve a desired quality of care. The quality of care from the provider is
independent of the quality of care from the hospital, and so the effect of cost-reduction
effort on quality of care is separately evaluated, and the hospital will receive the reward
payment only if the patient has received adequate care ( ) from both the hospital and the
provider (Figure 4.1). Each party may fail to provide the required quality of care. For
example, in the CJR model, the major quality measures are based on patient-reported
outcomes (PROs) and the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and
Systems (HCAHPS) survey scores (Terry, 2016). While these scores are based on
customer satisfaction, the quality of care provided by each provider in the treatment of a
affects these scores. Thus, I assume that the required quality of care is
uncertain, and can be achieved with some probability. I further assume that quality
decreases in line with an increasing effort to reduce costs (the lower the cost, the lower
the quality of care). I assume a linear effort-dependent function such that
To ensure well-defined probabilities, I bound the cost-reduction effort such that
.

Figure 4.1: Payment scheme depending on performance

.
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4.4.1

Centralized system (Strategy C)

As a benchmark scenario for a target price bundled payment model, I analyze a
centralized system in which the hospital (central planner) provides all the procedures and
care required for the treatment of a patient during an episode of treatment (single
s:

The first term is the central pl
treatment

is lower than the target price

. The third term occurs when

the total cost of treatment is higher than the target price, and thus the central planner is
penalized regardless of the quality of care (Figure 4.1). The fourth and fifth terms are the
cost of the cost-reduction effort that the central planner has exerted for each procedure.
-reduction
effort for the two procedures required to treat a patient.

s.t.
Because the cost savings are deterministic, the equivalent problem for the central
planner is to maximize its expected profit by choosing from the following two strategies.
1) Reward strategy:

s.t.
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2) Penalty strategy:

s.t.

Proposition 4.1 illustrates the optimal outcome and effort level of the central
planner. Thresholds
parameter

are defined in Appendix-C. The

is also defined in Appendix-C as the critical point of a differentiable

function.
Proposition 4.1: The central planner will
1) Receive reward payment if and only if
i.

if

ii.

if

iii.

if

. In this case,

, then

and

, then
, then

and
and

2) Have zero savings if and only if

. In this case,

and
3) Be penalized if and only if
and
Proposition 4.1 is illustrated in Figure 4.2.

. In this case,
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Figure 4.2: Optimal solution in the centralized system when

Proposition 4.1 shows how the central planner can exert cost-reduction effort to
achieve cost savings. The result is intuitive, in that the central planner should exert more
effort through the provider because the provider can reduce the cost of its procedure with
less effort. This intuition holds, regardless of the target price

,
for
-reduction efforts are

weakly decreasing as the target price increases (

); this is because (1) exerting cost-

reduction effort decreases the FFS payments, and (2) the higher the target price, the easier
to it is to earn the reward payment. When the target price is small (i.e.,
planner cannot achieve cost savings (i.e.,

), the central

) and will be penalized. In this region,

while the central planner exerts the maximum effort level through the provider, it limits
the cost-reduction effort of the hospital as the reduction in the penalty by the hospital does
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not compensate for the required investment. Figure 4.2 is illustrative, and the shape and
the insights are the same for other parameterizations.
Proposition 4.2 shows how the central plann
a target price is different from the total profit in the status quo decentralized system with
simple FFS payment model.

is formally defined in Appendix-C.

Proposition 4.2:
quo FFS model if the payer sets a target price that is higher than a threshold

. (i.e.,

)
As illustrated in Figure 4.3, the hospital and the provider would prefer a centralized
system with the target price bundled payment model to the status quo FFS model only if
the payer sets a target price that is higher than the
system,

threshold. Thus, in a centralized

is the absolute lower bound to the target price that the payer can set.

Figure 4.3: Profit and savings of the centralized system when
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4.4.2

Decentralized system (Strategy D)

In this scenario, I assume that both the hospital and the provider will be compensated
based on the FFS model but the payer will impose a target price on the hospital based on
the total system cost. Thus, the hospital will be rewarded or penalized depending on the
total cost of treatment compared to the target price. Because the provider will only be
compensated according to the FFS model, the provider does not exert any cost-reduction
effort (i.e.,

), resulting in

.
:

treatment. The fourth term is the cost of the cost-reduction effort.
Proposition 4.3 illustrates the optimal outcome and effort level of the hospital in a
decentralized system. Thresholds

are defined in Appendix-C.

Proposition 4.3: The hospital will
1) Receive reward payment if and only if
i.

if

ii.

if

. In this case,

, then
, then

and
and

2) Have zero savings if and only if

. In this case,

and
3) Be penalized if and only if
and
Proposition 4.3 is illustrated in Figure 4.4.

. In this case,
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Figure 4.4: Optimal solution in the decentralized system when
It is obvious that the savings under the centralized system are always weakly
higher than the savings under the decentralized system because in the decentralized
system, where the hospital receives (pays) all the reward (penalty) payments, the provider
will not exert any cost-reduction effort. Figure 4.5 illustrates the system savings in the
decentralized system using the same scale as in Figure 4.3.
Proposition 4.4:
in the status quo FFS model if the payer sets a target price that is higher than a threshold
(i.e.,

s.t.

). The provider is not affected when the

target price is only imposed on the hospital (i.e.,

).

Proposition 4.4 shows that in a decentralized system with no gain-sharing
agreement, the hospital and the provider would participate in a target price bundled
payment model only if the payer sets a target price that is higher than the

threshold.

Moreover, this lower bound is always higher than the lower bound for target price in the
centralized system (i.e.,

).
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Figure 4.5: Profits and savings of the decentralized system when

4.5
In this section, I investigate gain-sharing agreements to examine (1) how the hospital can
incentivize the provider to exert cost-reduction effort, and (2) whether both parties can be
better off under these agreements. To achieve the desired quality of care and the target
price, the hospital can offer the provider a gain-sharing agreement where the hospital
shares a portion
keep

of the reward and a portion

portion of the reward and

and

of the penalty with the provider, and

of the penalty for itself where
ows:

In this model, if the patient receives the required quality of care (i.e.
), then the hospital will keep
penalty, the provider must pay
written as follows:

of the reward. Similarly, if there is a
e
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I assume that the cost functions are public information, and thus the provider
knows the cost incurred by the hospital. Because it is easier for the provider to change the
cost of its procedure by switching between its resources, the provider can adjust its costreduction effort, given the treatment cost at the hospital. Therefore, I assume that the
provider decides on its cost-

-reduction

effort. Figure 4.6 illustrates the sequence of events.

Figure 4.6: Sequence of events
At the first stage of the game, the hospital decides on the gain-sharing agreement
to maximize its expected payoff. I assume that the provider accepts the contract
offered by the hospital (I do not impose a participation constraint), because I am
interested in the absolute lower bound on the target price (set by the payer) that makes
both the hospital and the provider participate in the target price bundled payment model.
For these reasons, the focus of the results will be on the non-binding case where the
provider is better off when accepting these agreements. Accordingly
is as follows:

s.t.
and
Next, the provider, knowing the contract terms, maximizes its expected payoff by
investing in cost-reduction effort:
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s.t.
I solve the problem using backward induction. The full details on the derivation of the
equilibrium solution are shown in Appendix-C. Proposition 4.5 illustrates the optimal
outcome and effort level of the decentralized system with gain-sharing agreement.
Thresholds

and expressions

, and

are

defined in Appendix-C. Proposition 4.5 is illustrated in Figure 4.7.
Proposition 4.5: The hospital and the provider will
1) Receive reward payment if and only if
i.

if

ii.

if

iii.

if

. In this case,

, then
, then
, then

2) Have zero savings if and only if

3) Be penalized if and only if

. In this case,

, where

Figure 4.7: Optimal solution in the decentralized system with gain-sharing
agreement when
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When the target price is small (i.e.,

), the hospital and the provider cannot

achieve cost savings and will be penalized. In this case, the hospital will not exert any
cost-reduction effort and will set

to minimize its loss. However, when rewards

are possible (dark shaded region), the hospital may exert effort to reduce the total
treatment cost. In this case, the hospital will get the reward and may share it with the
provider (

. The portion of the reward that the hospital shares with the provider

decreases as the target price increases because when the target price is high, it is easier to
be eligible for reward payment; thus, even if the provider can reduce its cost more
efficiently, the hospital does not need to incentivize the provider to exert as much costreduction effort.
Corollary 4.1: In the decentralized system with gain-sharing agreements,
1) The hospital may exert more cost-reduction effort as the target price increases

2) The hospital may exert more cost-reduction effort than the provider

Because the provider can reduce its cost more efficiently, intuition may suggest
that most of the savings should be generated through the provider (as is the case in
Section 4.4.1., Centralized system ) when the hospital uses gain-sharing agreements.
However, Corollary 4.1 shows that this is not always the case when using a gain-sharing
agreement. In fact, when the target price is high, in order to have higher probability of
qualifying for reward payment, the hospital needs the provider to reach the required
quality of care instead of exerting cost-reduction effort. Therefore, to make it unattractive
for the provider to exert costshare from the reward. To compensate for the increased cost (i.e., because of decreased
effort by the provider), the hospital will increase its own cost-reduction effort.
Furthermore, when the target price is too high (i.e.,

),

not compensate for the cost of the gain-sharing agreement for the hospital, and thus the
hospital would rather not use a gain-sharing agreement (

) and instead switch to

Strategy D and exert all the cost-reduction effort in-house. This result highlights the fact
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that if the payer does not set the target price properly, the target price bundled payment
strategy would not incentivize the hospital to arrange gain-sharing agreements with
providers to coordinate care and reduce the treatment cost.
Corollary 4.2:
One might expect that both the provider and the hospital would be better off as
the target price increases. Yet, as illustrated in Figure 4.8, this intuition may not hold
when the parties are in the reward zone (dark shaded region) because when the target
price is high, the hospital will exert most of the cost savings in-house to avoid sharing the
reward with the provider (Corollary 4.1). Hence, the provider may be better off when the
target price is low, because in this case, the hospital needs the provider to exert effort to
reduce total cost of treatment and thus increase savings.

Figure 4.8: Profits and savings of the decentralized system with gain-sharing
agreement when
Proposition 4.6: In the decentralized system with gain-sharing agreement, both the
hospit

s are higher than their respective profit in the status

quo FFS model if the payer sets a target price that is higher than a threshold
s.t

(i.e.,

).

Proposition 4.6 shows the absolute lower bound to the target price that the payer
can set in a decentralized system with gain-sharing agreements such that both the hospital
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and the provider are better off compared to the status quo FFS model. In the decentralized
system, this threshold is always smaller when the hospital uses gain-sharing agreements
as opposed to bearing all the reward/penalty (i.e.,

).

4.6
In the previous sections, I presented the analytical solution for the equilibrium of each
strategy and found the absolute lower bound for the target price that the payer can set in a
target price bundled payment model. In this section, I perform numerical analysis on the
equilibrium solutions to better understand the implications of the target price bundled
payment model to the payer. I
cost-reduction efficiency and the FFS profit margin (i.e.,

and

minimize its total spending, which can be defined as follows:

The first term is the FFS payments plus the profit margin that the hospital and the
provider receive on their respective treatment cost. The second and third terms are any
potential reward or penalty. Figure 4.9 illustrates the total spending in each strategy.

Figure 4.9: Total spending when
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Remark 4.1: The payer can reduce total spending relative to FFS, regardless of the
, by imposing a target price that is
equal to the total cost in the FFS model (i.e.,

).

To determine the target price for the CJR model, CMS uses a discount factor on
the total cost of treatment under FFS (i.e., it sets a lower target price to achieve cost
savings). However, my numerical analysis shows that the lower bounds for the target
price are always smaller than the total cost of treatment under FFS (i.e.,
). Thus, the payer can lower its total spending, using a target price bundled payment
strategy, even when the payer sets a target price that is equal to the current cost of
treatment (i.e.,

). Nevertheless, in a decentralized system, if the payer knows that

there will be a gain-sharing agreement between the hospital and the provider, the payer
can minimize the total spending by setting the target price
can only reduce the target price to

; otherwise, the payer

.

Remark 4.2: In a decentralized system, both the hospital and the provider prefer to use
gain-sharing agreements (i.e.,

) if

.
Remark 4.2 shows that when the payer sets an acceptable target price (i.e.,
), both the hospital and the provider would rather sign a gain-sharing agreement than
not sign an agreement. Following Corollary 4.1, the upper bound on the target price is
-sharing
agreement for the hospital. Thus, I provide a range for the target price such that, by
setting a target price in this range, the payer can incentivize the hospital and the provider
to enter into gain-sharing agreements.
In addition, my numerical experiments show that th
always lower when the hospital signs gain-sharing agreements with the provider unless
(Proposition 4.5) such that the hospital does not sign a gain-sharing agreement
even when it has the option to do so. Hence, in a target price bundled payment model,
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signing a gain-

-win-

t offers

higher profit for the hospital and the provider, and lower spending for the payer.
To understand the impact of the provid

-reduction efficiency (

FFS profit margin ( ) on the total spending, I show the ratio

) and the

for different parameter

settings in Figure 4.10.
Remark 4.3:

-

spending compared to the FFS profit margin.

Figure 4.10: Ratio of

for different values of

,

, and

Remark 4.3 implies that the payer might achieve greater savings by applying a
target price bundled payment model in settings where the healthcare providers have
higher asymmetry in cost-reduction efficiency; this is because higher asymmetry in the
ability to reduce cost increases the need to align the incentives of all parties.
Given a cost-reduction efficiency, the payer can always increase the savings by
reducing the profit margin, which will incentivize the participants to reduce the total
treatment cost to be eligible for a reward payment. However, reducing the total spending
might negatively impact the quality of care. To evaluate the potential impact of the
quality of care to the payer, I define the cost per quality ratio

. Therefore,
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as the target price bundled payment model with gain-sharing agreements reduces the total
spending (

) compared to the FFS spending (

achieving the desired quality score (i.e.,

), it will also reduce the probability of
), which reduces the cost per

quality ratio. Note that in the status quo FFS model, the desired quality score is reached
with the probability equal to one. In Figure 4.11 I evaluate the impact of

and the

on

the cost per quality ratio.

Figure 4.11: Ratio of

for different values of

,

, and

Figure 4.11 shows that changing the FFS profit margin ( ) can have an important
-off for the payer when reducing : while
it will incentivize the hospital and the provider to reduce the total treatment cost, it will
also negatively impact the quality of care.

4.7
4.7.1

Separate cost and quality

In the CJR model the CMS aims to coordinate the care and reduce the total spending by
imposing a target price bundled payment model on the hospital. However, imposing a
separate cost and quality measure for each involved party might have a higher potential
impact on the overall outcome. It is obvious that in such a setting hospital and the
provider would not enter into gain-sharing agreements as they do not have any common
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element in their profit functions. Thus,
follows.

Note that, both parties are evaluated based on their corresponding cost and quality.
Similarly, the

expected profit can be written as follows.

In other to have comparable results with the main model I assume that
. Figure 4.12 illustrates the total spending in each strategy.

Figure 4.12: Total spending when
Figure 4.12 shows that imposing a separate target price on the hospital and the
provider would be more effective in reducing the total spending when compared to a
single target price imposed to the hospital. Moreover, this policy would even have a total
spending lower than a centralized system in which the desired quality of care is evaluated
separately each party is responsible for their own cost and quality that is independent of
the outcome of the other care provider; however, when the quality of care measured
that a patient received elsewhere.
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4.7.2

Interdependency in cost functions

In the previous sections I assume that the cost functions of the hospital and the provider
are independent. However, when hospital decreases its treatment cost the quality of care
may also decrease. As a result, the health condition of a patient that arrives at the
provider depends on the services that she received at the hospital. Therefore, costreduction efforts at the hospital may negatively impact the treatment cost at the provider.
ost-reduction effort such that
where

is the degree of dependency. The analysis in the previous

sections are for the special case where

. In this section, I analyze the impact of

on

the gain sharing agreements and its implications for the payer.
-reduction effort on the
from exerting in-house cost-reduction effort. Thus, depending on the degree of
dependency ( ) the hospital would use the gain-sharing agreements for a wider set of
-reduction efforts to reduce total treatment cost.
Figure 4.13 illustrates the optimal solution in a decentralized system with gain-sharing
agreements when

.

Figure 4.13: Optimal solution in decentralized system with gain-sharing agreement
when
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Figure 4.13 shows that

does not have any impact on the penalty and zero

savings regions as in those regions hospital does not benefit from any cost-reduction
effort even when

. However, when compared to Figure 4.7, it is clear how the
-

sharing agreements.
To understand the impact of the degree of dependency in the cost functions on the
for different values of

Figure 4.14: Ratio of

in Figure 4.14.

for different values of

As shown in Figure 4.14 the degree of dependency , does not have any impact
on the outcome when the optimal in-house cost-reduction effort for the hospital is zero
(small and large target price). However, when the target price is intermediate and the
hospital requires to have some in-house cost savings, a system with lower

is always

preferred by all parties.

4.8
In this chapter, I examine the structure of gain-sharing agreements between a hospital and
s condition. Following the general framework of
the CJR payment model introduced by CMS, I investigate the effect of gain-sharing

99

agreements on the performance of a target price bundled payment model where the
hospital is responsible for meeting a threshold on the total treatment cost. Both the
hospital and the provider can exert cost-reduction effort to reduce their respective cost of
treatment, which will, in turn, negatively impact the quality of care.
My research provides practical guidance for the payer regarding the use of such
target price bundled payment models to coordinate care. I show that using gain-sharing
-win-

under the target price bundled

payment model. However, the choice of the target price is particularly important to
incentivize the hospital to enter into a gain-sharing agreement with the provider. The
target price should be low enough such that, to be eligible for reward payment, the
hospital would need the provider to reduce its cost. I also provide evidence that a target
price bundled payment model can be more effective in healthcare settings where the care
providers have asymmetric capabilities.
My study is based on a stylized mathematical model with several limiting
assumptions, and extending some of these assumptions can lead to interesting future
work. I assume that patients receive the required care from a hospital and a single
provider; yet, as is the case in joint and hip replacement procedures, there might be
multiple p
research might be to examine care-coordination in multi-agent pay-for-performance
agreements. I also assume that the cost functions are public information and the provider
can observ

-reduction effort. A more robust modeling approach would

be to model this problem as a multi-agent system with information asymmetry, where
.
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Chapter 5

5
In this thesis, I examine incentive problems in different environments, such as a
decentralized supply chain setting in a manufacturing industry and a fragmented
healthcare system. In the supply chain setting, I extend the literature by examining the
impact of capacity on the optimal channel structure when a contract manufacturer can
compete in both the component and final-product markets. I use a game theoretical
under different capacity
levels and market conditions.
In the healthcare setting, I examine optimal design of contracts to better
incentivize parties with conflicting interests in order to achieve an improved outcome in
the delivery of modern healthcare services. In Chapter 3, I model the interaction between
a payer and a provider when an optional diagnostic test can be used to predict the benefits
of an advanced treatment option. I design performance-based contracts to align the
incentives of the payer and the provider to achieve optimal use of the optional diagnostic
test. I introduce a new payment scheme in which the reward payments are tied to the
treatment decision of the provider, as well as the health outcome of patients. Further, I
model the imperfect information flow in fragmented healthcare settings where the
about whether or not the optimal course of action is used (moral hazard).
In Chapter 4, I examine the incentives of a hospital and a provider to reduce their
respective procedure costs when providing care for a patient who requires treatment from
both the hospital and the provider. This problem is particularly challenging, as the costreduction efforts of the hospital and the provider impact both the procedure cost and
quality of care. I investigate the effects of different payment structures
bundled payment, and bundled payment with gain-sharing model

such as FFS,

on the cost-reduction

efforts and profits of the hospital and the provider. I provide guidance, for the payer,
regarding the impact of these models on the health outcome of patients and the total
spending.
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5.1
The results of my study in Chapter 2 provide strategic insights for OBMs facing
competition from their supplier with limited capacity. I show that sharing capacity
through supply chain partnership may result in a more profitable industry, rather than a
price war. Such insight would increase the desirability of cooperating with competitors
when there is a potential to achieve economies of scale through increased capacity levels.
I demonstrate that the OBM only dual-sources its component demand when competition
in the finalcapacity while outsourcing the rest of the component demand to a third-party supplier. I
provide evidence for different resource allocation strategies of a CCM, and present an
explanation for both prioritizing capacity to a

the

own product output to shift profits to component sales to a competitor.
Chapter 3 provides evidence for the necessity of developing alternative payment
models as the availability of personalized medicine and the number of treatment options
increases. Furthermore, I highlight the importance of information flow in the fragmented
systems by showing that in a system with information asymmetry, it is never optimal to
use a diagnostic test for patients from all risk groups, even when the test can be available
for free. By showing how an increase in reputational concerns and altruistic behavior of a
provider may increase or decrease social welfare, I provide further support for the
inconsistent evidence regarding the impact of malpractice pressure on healthcare systems.
Finally, my findings suggest that it is not always optimal to make a diagnostic test
compulsory, even if it is recommended by the guidelines.
Chapter 4 provides guidelines for policymakers regarding the use of target price
bundled payment models to coordinate care in fragmented healthcare systems. I show
that such payment models can be more effective in healthcare settings where there is
more asymmetry between the cost efficiency of the parties involved in the treatment of
patients. In addition, I show that the decision on the target price is essential in
incentivizing the hospital to arrange gain-sharing agreements because when the target
price is low enough, the hospital needs the provider to exert effort to reduce the total
treatment cost (as it is more efficient for the provider to reduce the cost of its procedure).
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However, if the target price is not set properly, despite the fact that it is easier for a
provider to reduce its cost, the hospital might exert more cost-reduction effort than the
provider because the hospital would rather exert some effort in-house than share more of
the reward with the provider.
While each essay focuses on different settings they share a common insight
regarding the fragmented systems with conflicting interests. In all essays, I show that the
inefficiency caused by the decentralization may cause firms not to use some resources
even if they are efficient or available for free. In the first essay, the CCM might not
utilize free capacity. In the second essay, the test should not be used for patients from all
risk groups. In the third essay, the hospital may exert costly effort instead of benefiting
f

-reduction efficiency.

5.2
The studies in this thesis are based on a stylized mathematical models with several
limiting assumptions. Therefore, generalization of the underlying problems would be a
fruitful avenue for future research on incentive problems of parties with potential conflict
of interest in decentralized systems. For example, in a capacitated supply chain setting,
incorporating demand uncertainty in a supply chain with multiple strategic contract
manufacturers, each with the option of producing their own brand products can lead to
interesting future work.
In most circumstances patients have multiple options when deciding on which
healthcare provider to visit. Thus, considering the impact of competition among providers
reputational concerns on his test ordering behavior. Furthermore, most of the procedures
in fragmented health care systems, as in joint and hip replacement procedures, require
patients to receive treatment from multiple providers. Therefore, studying multi-agent
pay-for-performance agreements would be an interesting generalization to the carecoordination problem studied in this thesis.
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Appendix-A
In this section I derive the equilibrium solution for the 3-stage game defined in Section
2.3. From equation (2.1):

;

.I

only consider the region where

such that the two products are

competing.
1 - Stage 3 of the game
), so FOC gives:
. For firm C, using KKT conditions to
consider the capacity constraint, I have two optimal pricing strategy: 1) Non-binding
capacity constraint:

; 2) Binding capacity constraint:
. I solve for the optimal prices under each capacity

condition: Case 1) Non-binding capacity constraint:
; For case 1, I need

. Case 2) Binding capacity constraint:
.
2 - Stage 2 of the game
Case 1)

) which implies that

optimal allocation ratio
non-binding the extreme point is either zero or one (i.e.,
non-zero ratio (i.e.,
(i.e.,

). For firm O to set a

), the resulting profit should be higher than its profit when
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), such that
firm O will outsource all its component demand to firm C.
Case 2) Firm

there is

only one root to the FOC condition (

) which is a minimizer (

). However, depending on the values of the parameters, this
critical point may not be in the feasible region (

). Though, since there is only

one stationary point, I can claim that the profit function is maximized at an extreme point:
1) if the stationary point is in the feasible region, or 2) if the stationary point is not in the
feasible region and the profit function is a decreasing/increasing function of

in the

feasible region. Therefore, for firm O to set a non-zero ratio the resulting profit should be
higher than the profit when

(i.e.,

. In
the binding capacity case, in order to have noncapacity has to be between

. Because

is always and extreme point

multi-sourcing can only happen when firm C does not have enough capacity to fulfill
nd in which case firm O is the monopoly in the final-product
market and firm C acts as the supplier only. Consequently, I separate the game into three
competing strategies: 1)

, Coopetition (Superscript C); 2)

(Superscript T); and 3)

, Competition

, Supplier only (Superscript S).

I can express the optimal prices and capacity conditions for each strategy as follows. The
optimal prices for the coopetition strategy (C) are: Case 1)
iff

; Case 2)
iff

. The optimal
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prices for the competition strategy (T) are: Case 1)
iff

; Case 2)
iff
. The limits on

is competitive in the component market

that is firm O would get a non-negative profit if
city, firm C

will have the supplier only role. In this case, firm O is the monopoly in the final product
market that is only feasible when

with
. Firm

) and if necessary firm O multi-sources the rest of its
component demand from firm T.
3 - Stage 1 of the game
In the equilibrium, firm C maximizes its profit function by choosing its wholesale price
for each strategy that it acts as the
compatibility and participation constraints. The incentive compatibility constraint ensures
participation constraint makes sure that firm O gets at least as much as its outside option
strategy T. Finally, knowing the best outcome of each strategy, firm C chooses the
equilibrium strategy with its wholesale price for each capacity , competition level

,

.
Knowing the optimal set of prices in each strategy, fi
coopetition scenario with binding capacity constraint pricing strategy (case 2, represented
by superscript ) is:
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(IR)
(IR)
(IC)

Superscript

is used to represent nonbinding capacity case (case 1). I solve the problem

using KKT conditions. Note that, the two IR constraints are exclusive and thus I solve
two similar optimization problems for each.
the maximum wholesale price before firm O outsources to firm T (

. The optimal

wholesale price for collectively exhaustive and individually exclusive regions in case 2 of
coopetition scenario are:
iff

;

iff
;
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iff

;

iff

;
-binding case (case 1) of coopetition scenario is:

(IR)
(IR)
(IC)

KKT conditions would result in collectively exhaustive and individually exclusive
regions with optimal wholesale prices as follows.
iff
iff

;
.

Lemma A1: The maximum acceptable wholesale price by firm O such that it is better off
to outsource to firm C weakly decreases in capacity of firm C (i.e.,

.
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Proof of Lemma 2.1, Propositions 2.1, and Proposition 2.4: The Equilibrium
Solution
Despite the fact that each case (binding and non-binding) has wholesale prices for

constraint. For example, if firm C prefers binding capacity case it has to make sure that
). Moreover, firm C can choose to set wholesale price high enough so to
deter firm O from outsourcing to firm C (violating IR constraints). Firm C would set high
wholesale prices when firm Cs profit from competition strategy is more than its profit
from coopetition strategy (i.e.,

). Replacing the optimal pricing and wholesale

price of each region I
optimal outsourcing strategies is as follows.
Competition Strategy: (outsource to firm T)

Coopetition Strategy: (outsource to firm C)
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Figure 2.2 illustrates the four-region strategies that are outlined above at

where

is the maximum wholesale price of firm T in Region II. For expositional
convenience define capacity thresholds that separate the four regions:

Next, I
strategy is an increasing function in wholesale price (i.e.,

); therefore, firm C

would choose a wholesale price that is incentive compatible with firm O.

(IR)
(IR)
(IC)
(IC)

In the above maximization problem the two IC (IR) constraints are exclusive and do not
appear together. First, I find the minimum wholesale price that is required for firm C to
be better off being supplier only compared to its profit in the four-region strategies
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outlined above. Then, I find the wholesale price range, for which IR and IC constraints
are satisfied while keeping wholesale price higher than the minimum required for firm C

profit in the supplier only strategy will force either the IC or IR constraint to bind.
Therefore, I find the wholesale price that binds each constraint. Then, whichever
wholesale price that is smaller would be the maximum wholesale price that firm C can
charge in the supplier only strategy for its corresponding region depending on
. If this maximum acceptable wholesale price is larger than the minimum
required wholesale price for firm C to prefer the supplier only strategy, firm C would
apply the maximum acceptable wholesale price and thus incentivize firm O to buyout
I show the analysis
only for the Region IV where

. In this region the optimal strategy, without

consideration of supplier only strategy, is coopetition strategy with non-binding capacity
constraint. Therefore, firm C, in order to prefer the supplier only strategy, should have
; this would result in a minimum
required wholesale price of

for firm C to prefer the supplier only

strategy to coopetition strategy. Because in this region (i.e.,
) capacity is always larger than
I only need to consider
price of

(IR). Moreover, with a minimum wholesale

the capacity in this region is always larger than
which leads us to only consider

(IC). As mentioned, I only need

to consider the wholesale prices that make the IC and IR constraint binding.
;
(I only consider
the positive root).
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In the sequential equilibrium the supplier only strategy is optimal if and only if

; That is

The analysis for the rest of the regions is omitted due to redundancy. Figure 2.5 shows
the final equilibrium when product substitutability is

. Regions V and VI are

the supplier only strategy region. From the derivation of the above equilibrium I find that
the supplier only strategy is only optimal in the sequential equilibrium if and only if
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. Otherwise, the four-region
equilibrium presented above is the equilibrium solution of the game. Consequently, I
claim that the four-region equilibrium conditions presented above is the unique
equilibrium of this sequential game when

and Proposition 2.1 is a different

representation of the above-mentioned equilibrium regions. Table A.1 presents the
optimal prices, demands and profits of the firms in the four-region equilibrium when
.
Proof of Proposition 2.2: Sensitivity Analysis
a. From Table A.1 I can replace the corresponding demands:
. This inequality is always true as
long as

, which is always larger than

change around

, the second expression (i.e.,

) is the immediate result of the previous one.
b. This result is immediate from Table A.1 as long as
than

which is always larger

.

c. Profit function of firm C in Regions I and III is a concave function in its capacity
where

and

are the maximizers of its profit in these regions respectively. These

maximum points are situated within the regions (e.g.,

). Therefore, firm

;
. Moreover, I show that the absolute value of the slope in Region III is larger than that
of Region I:
.
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Proof of Proposition 2.3: Sensitivity Analysis
This proposition is an immediate result of Table A.1.
Derivation of equilibrium when there is no competition in component market
In this section I investigate the equilibrium conditions of the scenario presented in
Section 2.5 where firm C is the proprietary component manufacturer. I use the same logic
as the main model to derive the equilibrium. The optimal prices are: Case 1)
if and only if
(Condition 1); Case 2)

.

Knowing the best response optimal prices firm C will choose the wholesale price: Case
1)

) and has a maximum (
) at

has a maximum (

; Case 2)

(
) at

maintaining positive prices and profits (i.e,,

) and

. Note that, in binding case firm

).

Similar to the main model, there is an overlap between the capacity conditions. Since
firm C is the first mover, considering the incentive compatibility conditions of firm O, it
decides which of the optimal wholesale prices to choose when capacity is in the
overlapping region.
A)
; B)
.
Before claiming the above regions to be the equilibrium of the game I also consider a
case where firm C chooses to be a monopoly. In this scenario, firm C faces a capacity
constraint (i.e.,

) and only decides on its market price. Solving for the optimal
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price considering the price and demand non-negativity, I have:
.
Comparing with the cooperation scenario, I show that there are some cases that firm C
prefers to be monopoly in the final product market and thus results in four different
regions of equilibrium depending on f

:

1.

2.

3.

4.
Finally, I consider a case where firm C chooses to be supplier only. In this case, firm C
chooses the wholesale price

and only after that firm O will decide on the market price
). So, FOC gives:

. Then, firm C chooses its optimal wholesale price. Having a strictly concave
profit function (

):

dominated by its profit in the monopoly or coopetition scenarios presented in the fourregion equilibrium above. Consequently, I claim that the four-region equilibrium is the
unique equilibrium of this sequential game. Table A.2 presents the optimal prices,
demands and profits of the firms in each region of the equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 2.5: Value of competition
From Table A.1 and A.2 I can find

for any given capacity , product

substitutability

(e.g.,
). There are in total 11

different values of competition outcomes for firm O depending on capacity level and
product substitutability when

. Knowing the

functions I can derive

the results in Proposition 2.5. The results for firm C can be driven in the same way.
Table A.1: Equilibrium profits, prices, and demands of the firms when
Equilibrium
Region
I)
Competition
Binding

II)
Competition
Non-Binding

III)
Coopetition
Binding

IV)
Coopetition
Non-Binding

Firm C

Firm O

119

Table A.2: Equilibrium profits, prices, and demands of the firms when there is no
competition in the component market
Equilibrium
Region
1)

2)

3)

4)

Firm C

Firm O
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Appendix-B
Proof of Lemma 3.1: Applying the first-order condition (FOC) to the
objective function gives
distribution

, which is independent of patient risk

. This function is concave at

if and only if

; otherwise,
patients (i.e.,

).

follows from the proof of the Proposition 3.

Proof of Lemma 3.2: Since
where

, I focus on
.

Proof of Proposition 3.1: Applying the extended revelation principle to program (3.5), I
restrict my attention to direct mechanisms where the contracts are a pair of optimal
treatment choices for the two patient types (i.e.,

and

). Because

treating high-risk patients has relatively higher risk, the payer needs higher-valued
contract payment terms to ensure

participation (

the case where patients are low-risk. Thus, I omit the

) compared to

constraint and check if it holds

after designing optimal contracts. Furthermore, the provider has incentive to misrepresent
low-risk patients, so

always holds. I prove this conjecture by showing that

given the payment contracts. Thus, omitting

and

in the equilibrium

and

has to bind for all treatment choices. I
problem for the nine treatment choices given in Table A.3. Note that the provider may
choose to change the treatment choice when misrepresenting a patient (c.f.

and

).

Following Lemma 3.1 I know that the optimal treatment threshold decision of the
provider does not depend on the patient risk (i.e.,

) but does depend on

payment terms. Therefore, if the provider misrepresents his patient and chooses a contract
that is designed for other patient type, then the optimal treatment threshold will also
change for the patient because of the change in contract terms. For example, when
treatment option 2 is selected for both patient types (i.e.,
problem is:
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for other treatment choices can be presented similarly. When the test is
ordered, the payer

so

the optimal treatment threshold might be an interior point or an extreme point. Note that
if FOC gives a minimum (

) then the underlying treatment choice will be

dominated by other treatment choices that consider the extreme points (i.e.,
). Thus, if the test is ordered

or
. From

Lemma 3.1 the payer knows the best response function of the provider for optimal
treatment threshold of each patient type. Therefore, the payer would choose payment
terms such tha

) results in payer

optimal treatment threshold.
From

,

and

, I get
and

. Replacing the payment terms
ment threshold I get

. Thus, regardless of the slack variables (e.g.,

for all treatment choices with
), the provider would choose the

same treatment threshold for both patient types. The payer would choose the remaining
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two terms to maximize its value function. Replacing payment terms into payer
function, I show that when the test is used for both patient types (i.e.,
while the value function is independent of changes in
decreasing in

(i.e.,

); therefore,

(i.e.,

),
), it is always

. I have:

,

,

and

, where

and

. It can be shown that
and

and

when

,

,

.

Payment terms for the other treatment choices are derived using a similar approach. Next,
I check if

and

hold for all nine treatment choices. I show that when the provider

treats high-risk patients (i.e.,

) then

. Otherwise,
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. Using
integration by parts I have:
. This can be replicated for the risk distribution of low-risk patients, so I get
.
because

because

and

. Similar logic can be used to show

.

To find the equilibrium treatment decisions, I examine the conditions for
such that the payer would skip the test. Proposition 3.1
illustrates the equilibrium solution resulted from the comparison of the outcomes from all
treatment choices.
Proof of Corollary 3.1: Cases 1, 2, and 3 correspond to treatment choices with
where
, and

. Case 4 and 5 correspond to treatment choices with

,

, where

in case 5.

Proof of Corollary 3.2: The maximum value for
respectively.

and

is at

and

because

and

.
Proof of Corollary 3.3: Contract payment terms for all subgames have similar format as
in subgame 1 that is presented above. It can be shown that
because
when

. Lastly,

and

. Moreover,
(where

.

Proof of Corollary 3.4: Corollary 3.4 is a direct result of the Proposition 3.1.

)
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To illustrate how testing only one patient type always results in higher value for the payer
when compared to testing patients from both risk profiles

-

to-pay for the test for three different triangular distributions.

Figure A.1: Willingness-to-pay when

Figure A.2: Willingness-to-pay when

and

and
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Figure A.3: Willingness-to-pay when

and

As the two distributions get closer to each other the difference between testing
both patient types versus only one patient type gets smaller. We know that the
information rent in the optimal treatment strategies decreases as the two distributions get
closer to each other (i.e.,

). In addition, the value gained from testing patients from

both patient risk profiles in Case 6 does not outweigh the high information rent in this
Case. Thus, Cases 2 and 4 remain the best choices of the payer even when the two
distributions are similar.
Derivation for decentralized system with full information: The payer offers a type
specific contract to the provider and extracts the entire provider surplus.

and

are the same as in Equations (3.3) and (3.4). The optimization problem for each patient
type is:

s.t.
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The treatment threshold is

(cf. Lemma 3.1)

problem is to satisfy the following two conditions for each of the three options:
Conditions 1A) ensures that

) results

in

; Conditions 1B) is the
individual-rationality constraint,
.
Conditions 1A and 1B give the payment contracts for each option as well as the that
maximizes social welfare when

. When

, then, the provider should treat

patients if and only if,
. The payer compares social welfare
when

when

with

. Then

Proof of Proposition 3.2:

.
Using implicit function theorem, I have
.
I find the necessary conditions for Proposition 3.2.a. by including the optimality
conditions of case 4 from Proposition 3.1. Similar approach can be used for Proposition
3.
Proof of Proposition 3.3: The proof is similar to the logic presented in Proposition 3.
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Proof of Lemma 3.3 and Proposition 3.4: The program (3.12) can be solved similar to
the system with full information where the payer offers a type specific contract to the
provider and extracts the entire provider surplus. The pay
independent of changes in

;

value function is

when

.

The ex-ante outcome of the payer when the test is compulsory is:

In order to find when it is optimal to make the test compulsory, I examine the conditions
for

such that social welfare is higher when the test is

compulsory. Lemma 3.3 illustrates the region where compulsory testing is optimal when
.
Proof of Corollary 3.5: The maximum value for the function

is at

.
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Table A.3: Optimization problem for 9 subgames
Type-

(Option 1)
(Option 2)

Type-

(Option 0)

Treatment
choice

(Option 0)

(Option 1)

(Option 2)

s.t. OTC, ICH, ICL, IRH,
IRL

s.t. OTC, ICH, ICL,
IRH, IRL

s.t. OTC, ICH, ICL,
IRH, IRL

s.t. OTC, ICH, ICL, IRH,
IRL

s.t. OTC, ICH, ICL,
IRH, IRL

s.t. OTC, ICH, ICL,
IRH, IRL

s.t. OTC, ICH, ICL, IRH,
IRL

s.t. OTC, ICH, ICL,
IRH, IRL

s.t. OTC, ICH, ICL,
IRH, IRL

129

Appendix-C
Proof of Proposition 4.1: The
concave in efforts (i.e.,

on under reward strategy is
;

). Considering the non-negative savings

constraint, I have two optimal set of efforts:
1) Non-binding savings constraint:
where

solves

. Efforts are decreasing functions in target price (i.e.,

;

) and

. Given the optimal effort levels in the reward strategy, the savings constraint is
non-binding if and only if

where
such that

. To ensure

I

solve
Thus,
. If
then

. Furthermore,
such that if

2) Binding savings constraint: If

then

then

.
.

.
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The

is concave in efforts (i.e.,
;

). The first-order condition (FOC) gives

The savings are negative if and only if
such that

.

where

.

and
when

; thus, the

central planner would rather be in the penalty strategy instead of increasing efforts to

Proof of Proposition 4.2:
penalty and zero savings cases (cases 2 and 3 of Proposition 4.1) is always smaller than
the total status quo FFS profit:
Case 3)

.

Thus,

because
when

.

Case 2)

. Thus,

because

when

.
In case 1 where the central planner receives reward payment the central planner may be
better off compared to the total profit in the status quo FFS model.
Case 1.iii)
because
Case 1.ii)

. Thus,
when

.
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.
and

. Thus,

has a unique target price threshold and is satisfied if and only if (1)
and

(where
and

solves

such that

); and (2)

. Therefore, if

the

absolute lower bound threshold for the target price is located in Case 1.ii and otherwise in
Case 1.i.
Case 1.i)

and
Thus,

.

has a unique target price threshold and is satisfied if and only if
and

such that

is the unique threshold that solves

.

Therefore, the absolute lower bound of the target price in centralized system is as
follows.

Proof of Proposition 4.3: In this strategy, because the provider will only be compensated
according to the FFS model, the provider does not exert any cost-reduction effort (i.e.,
); resulting in

. The

strategy is concave in efforts (i.e.,
constraint, I have two optimal set of efforts:

). Considering the non-negative savings
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1) Non-binding savings constraint:

. Given the optimal

effort levels in the reward strategy, the savings constraint is non-binding if and only if
where
in target price (i.e.,

); thus, to ensure

. If

then

I solve

that gives

.

2) Binding savings constraint: If

then

.

.
The
(i.e.,

is concave in cost-reduction effort
). The first-order condition (FOC) gives

negative if and only if

where

and

. The savings are
.

when

; thus, the hospital would

rather be in the penalty strategy instead of increasing efforts to bind the savings

Proof of Proposition 4.4:

avings cases (cases 2

and 3 of Proposition 4.3) is always smaller than the total status quo FFS profit:
Case 3)

. Thus,
when

because

.

Case 2)

. Thus,

because

when

.

In case 1 where the hospital receives reward payment the hospital may be better off
compared to the status quo FFS model.
Case 1.ii)

. Thus,
when

.

because
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Case 1.i)

.

and
. Thus,

has a unique target price

threshold and is satisfied if and only if

. Therefore,

the absolute lower bound of the target price in decentralized system with no gain-sharing
agreement is

where

Proof of Proposition 4.5: The

is

concave in cost-reduction effort (i.e.,

). Considering the non-negative savings

constraint, I have two optimal set of efforts:
1) Non-binding savings constraint:
profit function is concave in
. From FOC I have

and

(i.e.,
and

;

). Define

where solves

; and

solves
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such that
Thus, by replacing

and

.

I get

. Given the optimal effort levels in the

reward strategy, the savings constraint is non-binding if and only if

where

. The hospital must be better off when offering a gainsharing agreement compared to the decentralized system with no gain-sharing agreement
(i.e.,

).

where

.
2) Binding savings constraint: If

then

.

.
The

gy is concave in effort (i.e.,

). The first-order condition (FOC) gives

. In the penalty case the

hospital will push all the penalty to the provider by setting
are negative if and only if
. When

. The savings

where

such that
and

when

; thus, the hospital would rather be in the penalty

Proof of Corollary 4.1: Corollary 4.1 is a direct result of the Proposition 4.5.
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Proof of Corollary 4.2: Following proposition 4.5, the hospital sets
. This implies that

if

. The

in target price because

.

Proof of Proposition 4.6: Under the gain sharing agreements hospital is always better off
compared to the status quo FFS model.

rofit in penalty and zero savings

cases is always smaller than the total status quo FFS profit. In case 1 where the provider
may be better off compared to the status quo FFS model:
is unique because

and

.

if
solves

where
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